United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
B. Russell, Senior Judge.
Jeffrey Scott Young filed the instant pro se
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before
the Court on an initial review of the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the
Court will dismiss the complaint.
is a convicted inmate at the Fulton County Detention Center
(FCDC). He sues FCDC Lieutenant Ronnie Fares in his
individual and official capacities. In the case caption,
Plaintiff also lists “Fulton County Detention Center
Officers” as Defendants.
states that he “was in a protective custody cell,
(supposedly) & I was having issues with a couple of
people in there.” He states that he gave a note to a
nurse to hand to Defendant Fares asking “to move me out
of that cell and please don't send me across the walk
from that cell to one of the other protective custody cells
thats only not even five fee away, cause people in the cell I
moved from can send letters, & go out to recreation with
the cell he put me in.” Plaintiff continues, “The
people can have the other people hurt me, and take my
commersary from me. Not even 24 hrs later I had two people
come to me saying I owe Commersary to next door, so I had to
give up $25.00 to stay in that cell.” He states that
“a month later I got into a fight cause I believe of
the people in the old cell I was in. So, now I'm in the
(hole) segregation for protecting myself for telling them
people I'm not coming off no more commersary.”
Plaintiff further asserts, “Now, I'm feel like
I'm going to get punish for something I been trying to
prevent not to happen. My life is in danger here, time is
harder here, got to look over my shoulders.” He states,
“I am mentally beat down, & my neck & back is
severely hurting from the fight that shouldn't took
place, if Lt. Ronnie Fares would've listen to me.”
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.'” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488
(quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58
F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although this Court
recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a
less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir.
1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent'
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up
unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610
F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
alleges that his move to the second protective custody cell
caused him to have to “give up” money from his
commissary account. The Court construes the allegations as a
claim for deprivation of Plaintiff's property in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that where adequate
remedies are provided by state law, the negligent or
intentional loss of personal property does not state a claim
cognizable under the Due Process Clause. Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), rev'd on other
grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. (1986).
In order to assert a claim for deprivation of property
without due process pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that the state post-deprivation procedures are
inadequate to remedy the deprivation. Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. at 543-44. The law of this circuit is
in accord. The Sixth Circuit held that “[i]n §
1983 damage suits claiming the deprivation of a property
interest without procedural due process of law, the plaintiff
must plead and prove that state remedies for redressing the
wrong are inadequate.” Vicory v. Walton, 721
F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1983). The Sixth Circuit has found
that Kentucky's statutory remedy for such losses is
adequate within the meaning of Parratt. See
Wagner v. Higgins, 754 F.2d 186, 191-92 (6th Cir. 1985).
Accordingly, this claim will be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Failure to protect
also alleges that a month after he was placed in the
protective custody cell he got into a fight. The Court
construes this as a claim for failure to protect. As a
general principle, a prison official has a duty under the
Eighth Amendment to ensure the “reasonable
safety” of inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 844 (1994). “A prison official's
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm
to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”
Id. at 828. A prison official cannot be found liable
for failing to protect an inmate unless “the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety[.]” Id. at 837.
states that the fight occurred a month after he was moved
into the cell, and he does not indicate that he complained to
Defendant Fares or any other jail personnel of fear for his
safety during that month. The Court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to show that Defendants knew of a substantial risk of
serious harm to Plaintiff due to the passage of a month from
Plaintiff s request to avoid the protective custody cell in
which he was placed before the alleged incident. Scott v.
Odmark, No. 95-1985, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 3400, at *6-7
(6th Cir. Feb. 20, 1997) (affirming district court's
finding that it was reasonable for Defendant not to perceive
risk of serious harm to the plaintiff where altercation with
other inmate had occurred five days prior to the alleged
incident); Blacker v. Satterthwaite, No.
1:08-cv-874, 2011 U.S. Dist. ...