United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
REBECCA GRADY JENNINGS, DISTRICT JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Ronald Basham's
(“Plaintiff”) Motion for Leave to File Amended
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (the
“Motion”) [DE 16] and BAE's Motion for Leave
to File a Sur-Reply on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to
File Amended Complaint [DE 19]. Briefing is complete, and the
motions are ripe. [DE 17; DE 18; DE 19; DE 20; DE 22]. For
the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Basham's Motion [DE
16] and GRANTS BAE's Motion for Leave to File a Sur-Reply
December 7, 2018, Plaintiff sued in this Court against BAE
Systems Land and Armaments L.P. (“Defendant”),
alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. [DE 1]. Defendant
answered, denying the allegations. [DE 8].
March 25, 2019, the parties entered a Joint Status Report.
[DE 12]. On May 2, 2019, Magistrate Judge Lindsay entered a
Scheduling Order, which set deadlines for amended pleadings
(May 16, 2019), fact discovery (September 27, 2019), and
dispositive motions (October 22, 2019). [DE 13]. On May 20,
2019, Plaintiff served written discovery, and Defendant
responded on July 1, 2019. [DE 18 at 100].
18, 2019, Plaintiff filed his Motion [DE 16]. Defendant
responded [DE 17], Plaintiff replied [DE 18], and Defendant
moved for leave to file a sur-reply [DE 19].
leave to amend a complaint after the scheduling order's
deadline implicates two Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 15 and Rule 16.” Carrizo (Utica) LLC v. City
of Girard, Ohio, 661 Fed.Appx. 364, 367 (6th Cir. 2016).
Rule 15 provides that a plaintiff may amend his pleading with
the court's leave, which should be freely given
“when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(a)(2); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962) (“In the absence of any apparent or declared
reason . . . the leave sought should, as the rules require,
be ‘freely given.'”). But when the deadline
established by the court's scheduling order has passed,
“a plaintiff must first show good cause under Rule
16(b) for failure earlier to seek leave to amend” and
the court “must evaluate prejudice to the nonmoving
party ‘before a court will [even] consider whether
amendment is proper under Rule 15(a).'”
Commerce Benefits Grp., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 326
Fed.Appx. 369, 376 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Leary v.
Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 909 (6th Cir.2003) (finding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying motion to amend filed after discovery and dispositive
motion deadlines). As a result, the court may examine the
standard factors governing amendment of complaints under Rule
15(a) only if it is satisfied that the date for the filing of
a motion for leave to amend is properly extended under the
good cause provisions of Rule 16 (b).
16's Good Cause Requirement
determining whether Plaintiff has shown good cause for
failure to seek leave to amend before the deadline had
passed, the Court considers whether: 1) Plaintiff has
exhibited diligence in trying to meet the scheduling
order's requirements; and 2) Defendant is prejudiced by
amendment. Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613,
625 (6th Cir. 2002).
contends that he showed good cause and diligence in his
attempt to meet the scheduling deadline because he moved to
“correct and clarify as soon as he confirmed there was
an issue with the dates he set forth in his Complaint.”
[DE 18 at 100]. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged:
Since filing his EEOC Charge on August 10, 2018, Basham has
applied for at least six promotions. Despite being highly
qualified for each of the positions for which he applied, he
was neither interviewed nor selected for promotion. Defendant
hired or promoted ...