United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. Stivers, Chief Judge United States District Court
matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment (DN 134). The motion is ripe for
adjudication. For the reasons that follow, the motion is
Nemak USA Inc. (“Nemak”) die casts aluminum
automobile parts. (Byrd Dep. 14:5, Oct. 30, 2018, DN 134-3;
Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Resp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 1, DN
136-1 [hereinafter Pl.'s Resp.]). Magna-Tech
Manufacturing, LLC (“Magna-Tech”) impregnates
die-casted aluminum automobile parts. (Byrd Dep. 14:5-6;
Pl.'s Resp. 1). On or about August 5, 2014, Magna-Tech
and Nemak entered into a Services Agreement whereby
Magna-Tech would “perform Impregnation Services”
for Nemak from June 12, 2014, to December 31, 2019.
(Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 2, ¶¶ 1.1-1.2, DN
134-2 [hereinafter Services Agreement]). The Services
Agreement allowed Magna-Tech to perform its services for
Nemak by operating within Nemak's facility in Glasgow,
Kentucky. (Services Agreement ¶ 2.1).
Nathaniel Edward Maysey (“Maysey”), was employed
by Express Services, Inc. (“Express Services”), a
temporary staffing company. (Pl.'s Resp. 3). He was
assigned to work for Magna-Tech on June 1, 2016. (Pl.'s
Resp. 3). Maysey was injured when his arm was caught in a
rotating centrifuge. (Pl.'s Resp. 5).
brought suit against Defendants in Kentucky state court,
claiming negligence and strict liability, and Defendants
subsequently removed this case to federal court. (Notice
Removal ¶¶ 1-2, DN 1). Nemak now moves for summary
judgment, disclaiming any liability for Maysey's
injuries. (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., DN 134).
Court has subject-matter jurisdiction of this matter based
upon diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §
STANDARD OF REVIEW
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact
that would preclude entry of judgment for the moving party as
a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears
the initial burden of stating the basis for the motion and
identifying the evidence demonstrating an absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the moving party
satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must then produce
specific evidence proving the existence of a genuine dispute
of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
for the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must do more
than merely show the existence of some “metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986) (citation omitted). Rather, the nonmoving party must
present facts proving that a genuine factual dispute exists
by “citing to particular parts of the materials in the
record” or by “showing that the materials cited
do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute . . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). “The mere existence of
a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving
party's] position will be insufficient” to overcome
summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
asserts that Kentucky premises liability and workers'
compensation law absolve it from any liability in this case.
Kentucky state law forms the substantive law used to evaluate
Maysey's claim. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A.
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 417 (2010)
(“[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity ‘apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law.'”
(quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465
owns the property on which Maysey suffered his injuries.
(Services Agreement 1). Nemak and Magna-Tech entered into an
agreement whereby Magna-Tech was allowed to install equipment
at Nemak's Glasgow facility and perform impregnation
services for ladder frames which Magna-Tech then sold to
Nemak. (Services Agreement ¶ 1.2). Express ...