United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
REBECCA GRADY JENNINGS, DISTRICT JUDGE.
a pro se civil-rights action brought by a pretrial
detainee pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is
before the Court for screening of Plaintiff's complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Upon consideration, the
Court will allow one claim to proceed, dismiss
Plaintiff's other claims, and allow him the opportunity
to amend his complaint.
Dewight Taylor is incarcerated at the Louisville Metro
Department of Corrections (LMDC). Plaintiff names as
Defendants in this action LMDC Director Eric Clark and LMDC
“Grievance Counselor” Sharon Shipley. Plaintiff
sues these Defendants in their official capacities only.
first alleges that he has “filed about black mold,
rust, and bacteria to prevent these to my lungs, other people
lungs, because I have real bad breathing problems at times. .
. . [Defendant] Clark has the responsibility to not violate
my right, but [he] continues to violate me no regards.”
Plaintiff further alleges that “this facility is 
infested with insects which cause physical harm to a human
([illegible] cockroaches, magets and fruit flies).”
Plaintiff also writes “7/11/2019 not meeting state
requirement calorie intake for inmates.” Plaintiff
states that “these are all signs of cruel and unusual
punishment which cannot be done [Defendant] Clark continues
to violate my Eighth Amendment.”
alleges that Defendant Shipley violated his rights by failing
to give him the form he needed to appeal a grievance.
relief, Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief in the
form of release from incarceration.
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the Court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 544
U.S. 199 (2007). In order to survive dismissal for failure to
state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “[A] pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)). However, while liberal, this standard of review does
require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions.
See Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum,
58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The Court's duty
“does not require [it] to conjure up unpled
allegations, ” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff.
Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise
would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would
also transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out
the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a
party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.
Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of Corr., 270
F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements are required to
state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). “A plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“Absent either element, a section 1983 claim will not
lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504
(6th Cir. 1991).
Eighth Amendment provides a convicted inmate the right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment, and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides the same
protections to pretrial detainees. Richmond v. Huq,
885 F.3d 928, 937 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Richko v. Wayne
Cty., 819 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2016)). The Sixth
Circuit has “historically analyzed Fourteenth Amendment
pretrial detainee claims and Eighth Amendment prisoner claims