United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. Stivers, Chief United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court on Defendant's Partial Motion
to Dismiss (DN 6). This matter is now ripe for adjudication.
For the reasons that follow, the motion is
Statement of Facts
case arises from the alleged wrongful termination of
Plaintiff Stephen Grainger (“Grainger”) by
Defendant Hoskin & Muir, Inc., d/b/a Cardinal Shower
Enclosures (“Cardinal”). (Compl. 2, DN 1-2).
Cardinal is a fabrication, tampering, and distribution
business for shower enclosures, commercial glazing systems,
and artisan glass. (Compl. ¶ 2).
began working for Cardinal some 18 years ago, primarily
charged with cutting glass to make “demo boxes.”
(Compl. ¶ 8). Grainger was first granted medical leave
in approximately May 2017 for a “foot issue, ”
but he quickly returned to work later that month. (Compl.
¶ 10). Grainger's work release form noted that he
should not have “prolonged standing or walking”
and that he should be placed on “limited duty”
with “sedentary work.” (Compl. Ex. 2, DN 1-2).
Grainger alleges that he returned to his former position and
received a chair as accommodation. (Compl. ¶ 10).
August 2017, Grainger had further difficulties with his foot
and underwent two surgeries to correct the problem, resulting
in medical leave beginning on August 21, 2017. (Compl. ¶
11; Compl. Ex. 3, DN 1-3). Based on the recommendation of Dr.
Matthew Jung (“Dr. Jung”), Grainger's
return-to-work was postponed several times, and he did not
return to Cardinal until March 19, 2018. (Compl.
¶¶ 12-16). Dr. Jung qualified his opinion that
Grainger could return to work on the basis that he should
have the “limitation of limited standing and limited
walking” and must “wear his pressure relief shoes
. . . .” (Compl. Ex. 7, DN 1-7). As such, Cardinal
placed Grainger in a temporary, full-time position in the
Clerical-Logistics Office, paying him his previous hourly
rate. (Compl. ¶ 17; Compl. Ex. 8, DN 1-8). Cardinal
specified that “the duration of this position will be
for up to 30 days, at which time your status will be
re-evaluated.” (Compl. Ex. 8). On April 12, 2018, Dr.
Jung informed Cardinal that Grainger's previous
limitations on standing and walking should remain in place at
least until his reevaluation on May 10, 2018. (Compl. Ex. 10,
DN 1-10). On April 13, 2018, Grainger was fired by Cardinal
“due to the continuation of [Grainger's] current
restrictions without change, combined with lack of light duty
work available for personal injuries.” (Compl. Ex. 11,
filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on December 6,
2018. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss Ex. 1, DN 6-2).
The EEOC issued a Right to Sue Letter on May 3, 2019. (Compl.
Ex. 1, DN 1-1).
8, 2019, Grainger filed the present action alleging
violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act (KCRA). (Compl. ¶¶ 25-44). On June 6,
2019, Cardinal moved to dismiss Counts II and III of the
Complaint-the ADA and KCRA claims, respectively-for failure
to state a claim. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 1, DN 6). Grainger
responded, and Cardinal replied. (Pl.'s Resp. Def.'s
Mot. Dismiss, DN 7; Def.'s Reply Mot. Dismiss, DN 8).
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action via
federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The
Complaint alleges violations of the FMLA and the ADA, both
which present federal questions. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-28).
The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the KCRA claim
because it arises from the same case and controversy as the
federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)). Even so, the
Court need not accept a party's “bare assertion of
legal conclusions.” Columbia Nat. Res., Inc. v.
Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th ...