United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville
CHARLES R. SIMPSON III, SENIOR JUDGE
case is before the Court on Plaintiff HCP Springs MOB
Louisville, LLC's (“HCP”) motion for summary
judgment, DN 23, against Defendant Christopher L. Nelson M.D.
(“Nelson”). Nelson failed to file a response to
this motion. There being no genuine issue of material fact,
the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment and refer the issue of damages to the magistrate
judge for a report and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. §
Factual Background and Procedural History
a breach of contract case. On April 6, 2011, Bluegrass Pain
Consultants, PLLC (“Bluegrass Pain”) entered into
an Office Lease Agreement with MRI Asset Management LLC to
lease Suite 60 at 6400 Dutchman's Parkway in Louisville
Kentucky (“Suite 60 Lease”). DN 23 at 2. This
lease was amended on February 21, 2014, to include Suite 80
at 6420 Dutchman's Parkway. Id. HCP acquired the
Suite 60 Lease from MRI Asset Management as a successor in
interest. Id. On June 30, 2017, Bluegrass Pain and
HCP entered into a Base Year Medical Office Lease Agreement
for Suite 170 at 6420 Dutchman's Parkway (“Suite
170 Lease”). Id. Nelson is the guarantor of
both leases. DN 1-1 at 71; DN 1-2 at 19.
Pain failed to pay rent for both leases in June, July, and
August of 2018. DN 7 at ¶ 23; DN 23 at 5. HCP sent
written notices to Bluegrass Pain informing it of its
default. See DN 1-4. On or about September 3, 2018,
Bluegrass Pain vacated each office suite. DN 7 at ¶ 26;
DN 23 at 5. Bluegrass Pain then failed to pay HCP rent for
September of 2018. DN 7 at ¶ 25; DN 23 at 5. HCP sent
another written notice to Bluegrass Pain informing it of its
default. DN 23 at 5.
October 19, 2018, HCP filed this suit against Bluegrass Pain
and Nelson. DN 1. In its complaint, HCP alleged Bluegrass
Pain breached both leases, Nelson breached his guarantees,
and HCP is entitled to damages. Id. at 7-10. On May
10, 2019, Bluegrass Pain filed a notice of bankruptcy. DN 16.
This Court entered an order that stayed all further
proceedings against Bluegrass Pain pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 362. DN 19. HCP filed this motion for summary judgment
against Nelson on June 17, 2019. DN 23. Nelson has not
judgment is appropriate when the moving party can show that
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[T]he mere existence
of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue
of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A genuine issue for
trial exists when “there is sufficient evidence
favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict
for that party.” Id. In undertaking this
analysis, the Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proof
for establishing the nonexistence of any issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). They can meet this burden by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record” or
“showing that the materials cited do not establish
the…presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)(1). This burden can also be met by demonstrating that
the nonmoving party “fail[ed] to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322. The nonmoving party also “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
argues that (1) its claim can proceed against Nelson under
the automatic stay, (2) Bluegrass Pain breached both leases,
and (3) it is entitled to recover damages from Nelson. The
Court will address each argument.
argues that its motion for summary judgment “only seeks
relief against Nelson” and can proceed under the
Court's order. DN 23 at 1. The Court agrees. In the Sixth
Circuit, a stay under § 362 is strictly construed to
only prevent proceedings against the debtor. Patton v.
Bearden,8 F.3d 343 at 348-349 (6th Cir. 1993). The stay
does not automatically preclude claims against non-debtor
co-defendants from proceeding. Lynch ...