United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
LOUIS F. HOUSE, III Plaintiff
LMDC et al., Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge.
a pro se prisoner civil-rights action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted
Plaintiff Louis F. House, III, leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court for screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims but
allow him the opportunity to amend his complaint.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
was previously incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the
Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC). He brings
this suit against LMDC and LMDC Jailer Mark Bolton. He does
not indicate in what capacity he sues Defendant Bolton.
alleges that prior to his incarceration at LMDC, he was shot
eight times - once in the back, once is his chest, twice in
his left arm, once in his left thigh, twice in his right
thigh, and once in his “achilles.” Plaintiff
states that upon his arrival at LMDC he showed the nurses his
open gunshot wounds and walked through the metal detector to
show them that he still had bullets in his legs. Plaintiff
states that he was told that he would be placed on the
medical floor where he would be seen by a nurse everyday but
that he never was. Plaintiff alleges that he continued to
show various nurses and correctional officers his gunshot
wounds but none of them did anything about it.
next alleges that he was attacked by at least eight inmates.
He claims that they “busted my gunshot wounds open, I
felt my left leg heating up where my bullet is stuck in my
leg. I had bruises and knots on my left arm where I was shot
twice.” Plaintiff states that he was then put in a room
where pictures were taken of his body and where he was seen
by a nurse who observed that he had “busted open
gunshot wounds” which were bleeding. Plaintiff alleges
that he was still not “placed on medical floor and
dorm” and that he never had “follow ups or check
ups from a doctor or nurse after the incident.”
concludes his complaint as follows:
I still have open gunshot wounds and I notified every
correction officer an nurse on this floor. I still have pains
in my chest from where I was shot. I have been in [LMDC]
since May 16th, 2019, today is June
16th and I have not seen a doctor unless my gun
shot wounds starts to bleed to the point where they have no
choice but to see me. . . . I am still in general population
where I can barely protect myself if any altercation was to
go on. I still have pains in my arm from where I was kicked
and jumped by other inmates.
relief, Plaintiff seeks damages.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).