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Freeman v. Carraway

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah

November 19, 2019




         Plaintiff David M. Freeman filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court upon initial review of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss some of Plaintiff's claims and allow other claims to proceed for further development.


         Plaintiff is a convicted inmate at the Marshall County Detention Center (MCDC). He names the following Defendants: Heather Carraway, a nurse at MCDC; Advance Correctional Healthcare (ACH), the MCDC medical provider; and Shawn Goard and Roger Ford, each of whom he identifies as a “Jailer” at MCDC. He sues Defendants in their individual and official capacities.

         Plaintiff states that Defendant Carraway “has continuously denied me medical treatment here at Marshall County Jail.” He maintains that Defendant Carraway is very aware of all of my medical conditions . . . .” and describes those conditions as follows: “I have P.T.S.D. which can give me heart attacks, I have three stints in my heart, I had my leg shattered before my incarceration & my knee needs to be replaced, my neck was broken before my incarceration an back as well broken that needs replace & fix.” He also states that he has “chronic liver disease- blood disease & degenaritive disease, I have hepatitis C . . . .” Plaintiff reports that he is currently sleeping on a “very small mattress on the floor.” He further states as follows:

I am currently receiving absolutely no medical treatment and am continuously denied to see a doctor for weekly or monthly checkups. I am also continuously denied the proper medication I am suppose to be on and that my body must have, to prevent any farther damages, and that can possibly help cushen- (relieve) some of the physical pain- (torture) that my body indures 24 hours a day 7 days a week in every minute and hour!!

         Plaintiff states that Defendant ACH “is over the medical department here at Marshall County Jail and is who defendant Heather Carraway works for.” He also asserts that Defendant Goard, Carraway, Ford, and ACH “are all responsible of all the same violations written above[.]” He alleges violations of his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He also states, “This is also male practice and very unproffessional in their part due that I am under their care an am limited to what I can myself do, and not allowed to do. I also am in fear of their retaliation now and in the future!!”

         As relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and costs.


         When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

         In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

         III. ANALYSIS

         1. Official-capacity claims

         Plaintiff sues Defendants Carraway, Goard, and Ford in their official capacities. “Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent [] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Defendants Goard and Ford are employees of Marshall County. It appears that Defendant Carraway is an employee of Defendant ACH. Therefore, Plaintiff official-capacity claims against Defendants Goard and Ford ...

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