United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
DAVID M. FREEMAN PLAINTIFF
HEATHER CARRAWAY et al. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
B. RUSSELL, SENIOR JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
David M. Freeman filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action proceeding in forma pauperis.
This matter is before the Court upon initial review of the
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons
stated below, the Court will dismiss some of Plaintiff's
claims and allow other claims to proceed for further
SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
is a convicted inmate at the Marshall County Detention Center
(MCDC). He names the following Defendants: Heather Carraway,
a nurse at MCDC; Advance Correctional Healthcare (ACH), the
MCDC medical provider; and Shawn Goard and Roger Ford, each
of whom he identifies as a “Jailer” at MCDC. He
sues Defendants in their individual and official capacities.
states that Defendant Carraway “has continuously denied
me medical treatment here at Marshall County Jail.” He
maintains that Defendant Carraway is very aware of all of my
medical conditions . . . .” and describes those
conditions as follows: “I have P.T.S.D. which can give
me heart attacks, I have three stints in my heart, I had my
leg shattered before my incarceration & my knee needs to
be replaced, my neck was broken before my incarceration an
back as well broken that needs replace & fix.” He
also states that he has “chronic liver disease- blood
disease & degenaritive disease, I have hepatitis C . . .
.” Plaintiff reports that he is currently sleeping on a
“very small mattress on the floor.” He further
states as follows:
I am currently receiving absolutely no medical treatment and
am continuously denied to see a doctor for weekly or monthly
checkups. I am also continuously denied the proper medication
I am suppose to be on and that my body must have, to prevent
any farther damages, and that can possibly help cushen-
(relieve) some of the physical pain- (torture) that my body
indures 24 hours a day 7 days a week in every minute and
states that Defendant ACH “is over the medical
department here at Marshall County Jail and is who defendant
Heather Carraway works for.” He also asserts that
Defendant Goard, Carraway, Ford, and ACH “are all
responsible of all the same violations written
above[.]” He alleges violations of his rights under the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. He also states, “This is also male practice
and very unproffessional in their part due that I am under
their care an am limited to what I can myself do, and not
allowed to do. I also am in fear of their retaliation now and
in the future!!”
relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory and punitive damages,
injunctive relief, and costs.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.'” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488
(quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58
F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although this Court
recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a
less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir.
1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent'
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up
unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610
F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
sues Defendants Carraway, Goard, and Ford in their official
capacities. “Official-capacity suits . . .
‘generally represent  another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.'” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Defendants
Goard and Ford are employees of Marshall County. It appears
that Defendant Carraway is an employee of Defendant ACH.
Therefore, Plaintiff official-capacity claims against
Defendants Goard and Ford ...