United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
B. RUSSELL, SENIOR JUDGE
matter comes before the Court upon Motion by Defendant Chad
Elliot Bradley (“Defendant”) to reconsider the
Court's order denying his Motion to Suppress. [DN 38.]
The time to respond has passed. This matter is ripe for
adjudication. For the following reasons, Defendant's
motion is DENIED.
case arises from Defendant's arrest on November 27, 2018.
As a result of the arrest, Defendant has been charged with
one count of possession of methamphetamine with the intent to
distribute. [DN 1.] ¶ 7:55 p.m. on November 27, 2018,
Deputy Brooke Nelms obtained a search warrant for
Defendant's residence. [Supp. Hrg. R. (Nelms) 62:
¶¶ 21-25, 63: ¶¶ 1-2.] The warrant was
executed that night by detectives and deputies from the
Graves County Sheriffs Department, and the Kentucky State
Police. [Supp. Hrg. R. (Pervine) 28: ¶¶ 1-2.] The
search warrant only authorized a search of Defendant's
home. It did not authorize a search of Defendant's
vehicle or boat. [Supp. Hrg. R. (Edwards) 46: ¶¶
23-25, 47: ¶¶ 1-4.]
Edwards began searching the residence for drugs and found a
smoking pipe and a marijuana roach. [Supp. Hrg. R. (Edwards)
40: ¶¶ 15-19, 41: ¶¶ 2-8.] Once he
completed the search of the home, Deputy Edwards went outside
and searched Defendant's boat. After searching the boat,
he opened the door of Defendant's black truck and found a
black bag on the seat. [Supp. Hrg. R. (Edwards) 41:
¶¶ 22-25.] According to Deputy Edwards, Trooper
Pervine then came outside to tell him the truck was not
included in the search warrant. [Supp. Hrg. R. (Edwards) 51:
¶¶ 3-4.] Trooper Sullivan arrived with his K9,
Diego, after Deputy Edwards opened the door of the truck.
[Supp. Hrg. R. (Edwards) 43: ¶¶ 5-7.]
arrival, Trooper Sullivan “ran” his K9 around
Defendant's parked truck and the K9 showed a
“change in behavior” between the driver's
door and the rear door. [Supp. Hrg. R. (Sullivan) 7:
¶¶ 10-13, 17 ¶¶ 14-17.] The K9 did not
signal an “alert” but the change in behavior
signaled an odor of narcotics. [Supp. Hrg. R. (Sullivan) 7:
¶¶ 14-16.] Sullivan then ran the K9 around the car
a second time to confirm the change in behavior. [Supp. Hrg.
R. (Sullivan) 8: ¶¶ 9-12.] The K9 exhibited the
same behavior and Sullivan subsequently informed a deputy
that there was enough reason for a search. [Supp. Hrg. R.
(Sullivan) 8: ¶¶ 11-13.] A search was conducted,
and methamphetamine was found. [Supp. Hrg. R. (Sullivan) 20:
previously filed a motion to suppress that this Court denied.
[DN 30.] Defendant now asks the Court to reconsider his
has filed this motion more than 28 days after entry of the
Order denying the Motion to Suppress. However, the Court
finds that there were extenuating circumstances causing the
delay. Consideration of this motion causes no prejudice to
the Government. Therefore, the Court will consider this
Motion under Rule 59(e).
courts have inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders
and reopen any part of a case before entry of a final
judgment.” In re Saffady, 524 F.3d 799, 803 (6th Cir.
2008). “A district court may modify, or even rescind,
such interlocutory orders.” Mallory v. Eyrich,
922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir. 1991). Although the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide expressly for
“motions for reconsideration, ” courts generally
construe such motions as motions to alter or amend a judgment
under Rule 59(e). E.g., Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro.
Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 206 (6th Cir. 1990);
Taylor v. Colo. State Univ., 2013 WL 1563233, at
*8-9 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 12, 2013).
Sixth Circuit has consistently held that a Rule 59 motion
should not be used either to reargue a case on the merits or
to reargue issues already presented, see Whitehead v.
Bowen, 301 Fed.Appx. 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v.
Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998)), or otherwise
to “merely restyle or rehash the initial issues,
” White v. Hitachi, Ltd., 2008 WL 782565, at
*1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “It is not the function of a motion
to reconsider arguments already considered and rejected by
the court.” Id. (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit instructs that a motion for
reconsideration should only be granted on four grounds:
“Under Rule 59, a court may alter or amend a judgment
based on: ‘(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly
discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling
law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.'”
Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th
Cir. 2005)). Furthermore, because there is an interest in the
finality of a decision, this Court and other district courts
have held that “[s]uch motions are extraordinary and
sparingly granted.” Marshall v. Johnson, 2007
WL 1175046, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 2007) (citing
Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal,
Inc., 904 F.Supp. 644, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1995)); accord
Rottmund v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 813 F.Supp.
1104, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
argues that the Court committed a clear error of law in its
determination that probable cause was established independent
of Deputy Edwards' improper search. In support, Defendant
cites to Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533
(1988). The Court in Murray held that when an illegal search
has taken place, evidence is still admissible if the
“later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an
earlier, tainted one”. Id. at 542. Defendant
contends that the discovery of the evidence flows directly
from Deputy Edwards' improper search and must therefore
Sullivan testified that he was requested to help execute a
search warrant. [Supp. Hrg. R. (Sullivan) 7: ¶¶
5-6.] He was unaware of any search of the vehicle prior to
his arrival. [Id. at ¶¶ 9-14.] Defendant
states that Trooper Sullivan was called because
“officers were suspicious of the presence of narcotics
inside the truck based on what Deputy Edwards observed when
conducting his illegal search.” [DN 38 at 6.] In
support of this argument, Defendant relies on Deputy
Edwards' statement that “they made the notion to
call a K9” after Trooper Pervine informed Deputy
Edwards that the truck was not in the search warrant. [Supp.
Hrg. R. (Edwards) 51: ¶¶ 3-7.] Trooper Pervine
informed Deputy Edwards that the truck was not in the ...