United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah Division
BRANDON R. BRUIN PLAINTIFF
WARDEN RANDY WHITE et al. DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
B. Russell, Senior United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court upon a motion by Defendant,
Melissa Edmonds, to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against
her. (DN 122). Plaintiff, Brandon R. Bruin, has not responded
and the time to do so has passed. Fully briefed, this motion
is ripe for review and for the following reasons, it is
is a convicted prisoner currently incarcerated at the Lee
Adjustment Center. His claims in this action, however,
concern his incarceration at the Kentucky State Penitentiary
(“KSP”). Plaintiff filed a series of complaints,
supplemental complaints, and amendments to complaints whereby
he raises numerous claims against more than forty defendants.
Several of these defendants have been terminated from the
action. Plaintiff's claims generally arise from seven
separate events: (1) the cutting of his dreadlocks; (2) being
assaulted by another inmate; (3) the denial of a
“Vegan/Ital” diet; (4) excessive force during a
cell extraction; (5) allegedly deficient medical care
regarding high blood pressure, headaches, and numbness; (6)
claims arising from Plaintiff's fasting and hunger
strike; and (7) alleged interference with Plaintiff's
access to the courts and medical records.
initial review (DN 48) of the complaint (DN 1) pursuant to
§ 1915A, the Court allowed the following claims to
continue: (1) Plaintiff's First Amendment free-exercise
and Fourteenth Amendment due-process and equal-protection
claims arising out of the May 2016 cutting of his dreadlocks
and refusal to allow Plaintiff to send the cut dreadlocks
home against Defendants Charles Crick, Roger Mitchell, James
Smith, James R. Beeler, and Randy White in their official
capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual
capacities for damages and injunctive relief; and (2)
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim
arising out of an assault by another inmate in June 2016
against Defendants Bruce Von Dewingelo, Jill Roberts, and
Micah Melton in their individual capacities for damages.
initial review (DN 97) of Plaintiff's first wave of
amended and supplemental complaints (DNs 20, 23, & 26),
the Court allowed the following claims to continue: (1) the
First Amendment free-exercise and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act claims regarding denial of a
“Vegan/Ital Diet” against Defendants Melton,
White, Terry Griffith, and Charles “Aaron” Davis
in their official capacities for injunctive relief and in
their individual capacities for damages and injunctive
relief; (2) the First Amendment free-exercise claim regarding
the cutting of dreadlocks against Defendant John Gibbs in his
official capacity for injunctive relief and in his individual
capacity for damages and injunctive relief and the RLUIPA
claim regarding the cutting of dreadlocks against Defendants
Charles Crick, Mitchell, James Smith, Beeler, White, Belt,
Skyla Grief, Melton, Griffith, and Gibbs in their official
capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual
capacities for damages and injunctive relief; (3) the Eighth
Amendment excessive-force claims regarding the July 30/August
1, 2016 cell extraction against Defendants Jonathan Ruch and
Griffith in their individual capacities for damages; and (4)
the Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need regarding Plaintiff's claims of
untreated high blood pressure, migraine headaches, loss of
vision, tingling in limbs/fingers/toes, and episodes of loss
of consciousness against Defendants Davis, Karen Vickery, and
Shastine Tangilag in their individual capacities for damages
and injunctive relief.
initial review (DN 112) of Plaintiff's second wave of
amended and supplemental complaints (DNs 34, 54, 57, &
89) this Court allowed the following claims to continue: (1)
the First Amendment free-exercise claim regarding the May
2016 cutting of dreadlocks against Defendant Duncan; (2) the
various First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims and
state-law medical negligence claims arising from a
“Religious Fast” Plaintiff began on December 14,
2016, which turned into a hunger strike requiring multiple
cell extractions for blood work and eventual forced hydration
in January 2017 against Defendants White, Ramey, Neely,
Raines, Bruce Bauer, Grief, Burkett, Edmonds, Mitchell, James
Smith, Michael Alexander, Inglish, Ruch, Corley, Lauren N.
Hawkins, Rodriquez, Coombs, Hope, Beeler, and Von Dewingelo;
and (3) the Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims against
Defendants Swank and DeBoe, the Eighth Amendment
failure-to-protect claim against Defendant Grief, the First
Amendment free-exercise claim against Defendants Coombs and
Rodriquez, and the retaliation claims against Defendants
Rodriquez, Coombs, DeBoe, Swank, and Grief.
Edmonds now moves the Court to dismiss all claims against her
and terminate her from this action. For the following
reasons, her motion is GRANTED.
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]he
defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for relief.” Directv, Inc.
v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir.
1991)). A complaint must contain "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to survive a
motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), a party must
"plead enough factual matter to raise a
'plausible' inference of wrongdoing." 16630
Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727
F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d
868 (2009)). A claim becomes plausible "when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Should the
well-pleaded facts support no "more than the mere
possibility of misconduct," then dismissal is warranted.
Id. at 679. The Court may grant a motion to dismiss
"only if, after drawing all reasonable inferences from
the allegations in the complaint in favor of the plaintiff,
the complaint still fails to allege a plausible theory of
relief." Garceau v. City of Flint, 572
Fed.Appx. 369, 371 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 677-79).
action, Plaintiff has filed a complaint and numerous amended
and supplemental complaints. See, e.g., (DN 1); (DN
20); (DN 23); (DN 26); (DN 34); (DN 54); (DN 57); (DN 89).
The only pleading concerning Defendant Edmonds, however, is
(DN 57). Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant
Edmonds are contained in the following passage:
Furthermore, Plaintiff's cell is directly across from the
Medical Personnel dining area, were all C.C.S Defendants were
dining prior to attempting to allegedly draw blood from
Plaintiff. After Plaintiff was secured in cell C.C.C. (All)
Defendants congregated in the dining room and Defendant,
Nancy Neely abrutly spoke out, “I should have tried his
jugular.” And all laughed in unison, ie., Neely, Bauer,
Raines, Ramey and Edmonds.
On January 27, 2017 at appr'x 2:45 pm non-defendant
officer Matthew Dinovo contacted Defendant, Roger Mitchell
via telephone in records to an envelope found in the officers
work desk in Medical addressed to Plaintiff, addressee
“K.S.P Medical Records” Defendant Roger Mitchell
informed Officer, ...