United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CHARLES R. SIMPSON III, SENIOR JUDGE
matter is before the Court on motion to dismiss/motion for
summary judgment by Defendants, DN 20, and motion pursuant to
FRCP 56(d) by Plaintiff, DN 31. For the following reasons,
Defendants’ motion will be stayed pending discovery on
the limited issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff’s 56(d) motion will be granted in accordance
with the guidelines set forth below.
Mabel Enriquez-Perdomo (“Plaintiff”) is a
Honduran national. DN 1, p. 2. On August 17, 2017, Plaintiff
visited the Louisville office of the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) Agency to provide bond money
and secure pre-trial release of a detained individual. DN 1,
p. 3. At the time of her visit, Plaintiff’s Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) status was
current with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”). DN 20, p. 3. After providing
biographical information, DN 20-3, p. 1, Plaintiff was
detained by ICE staff and transported to at least one other
location to be processed for removal from the United States,
DN 20-1, p. 3. Plaintiff was released from custody on or
about August 24, 2017 in Boone County, Kentucky. DN 1, p. 5.
initiated this action against four ICE agents-Ricardo A.
Newman, Joseph M. Phelps, John R. Korkin, and Shawn Byers
(“Defendants”)-seeking damages under
Bivens for alleged constitutional violations.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff and Defendants
dispute the facts that led up to Plaintiff’s detention.
complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants “actually
checked the Agency’s database and confirmed that
Plaintiff had properly registered and been approved for DACA
status by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and
that her DACA status was current.” DN 1, p. 4.
Plaintiff claims that “Despite their knowledge of
Plaintiff’s lawful status Defendants … arrested
and detained Plaintiff anyway.” Id. Plaintiff
further alleges that “Defendants had no factual basis
to believe that Plaintiff was not lawfully in the U.S. nor
did they have any other factual basis to believe that [she]
was subject to lawful arrest.” Id. Finally,
Plaintiff asserts she was “never informed of the reason
for her arrest and detention, nor was she informed of the
reasons for the multiple moves.” Id. at 5.
paint a very different picture. Defendant Ricardo Newman
alleges he personally reviewed Ms. Enriquez’s
immigration status in the Computer-Linked Application
Information Management System (“CLAIMS”), the
Person Centric Query Service (“PCQS”) and the
Enforce Remove Module. Newman claims this review
“confirmed that Ms. Enriquez-Perdomo was subject to an
existing removal order from 2004 and that her [DACA] expired
in March 2017.” DN 20-4, p. 1–2. After his
“independent review, ” Newman alleges he
“asked [Defendant] John Korkin to check additional
databases to determine whether [Plaintiff] had current
DACA.” Id. Korkin alleges he “searched
all of the USCIS databases that [he] believed would contain
information about Ms. Enriquez-Perdomo’s DACA status,
” including CLAIMS, PCQS, Enterprise Document
Management System, and the Central Index System. DN 20-5, p.
I. According to Korkin, “None of the databases [he]
searched revealed that Ms. Enriquez-Perdomo had current DACA
status.” Id. After Korkin “could not
confirm Ms. Enriquez-Perdomo's claim that her DACA was
current, ” Newman alleges he “processed Ms.
Enriquez-Perdomo and notified her that she was being charged
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182.” DN 20-4, p. 2.
Ms. Enriquez was transported from the Louisville ICE office,
Newman says, “it was discovered that USCIS had begun
inputting DACA information into the Electronic Immigration
System (ELIS), ” and the databases that he and Korkin
had checked “no longer had the most up-to-date
information.” Id. Defendants claim “Ms.
Enriquez-Perdomo was promptly released after her DACA status
was confirmed in ELIS.” Id.
Subject matter jurisdiction
challenge the factual existence of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
DN 20-1, p. 4.
must resolve questions of subject matter jurisdiction before
ruling on the merits of the claim. Imhoff Inv., L.L.C. v.
Alfoccino, Inc., 792 F.3d 627, 631 (6th Cir. 2015)
(citing Gross v. Hougland,712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th
Cir.1983)). "Trial courts have broad discretion and
inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions
that may dispose of the case, ” such as subject matter
jurisdiction, are ...