United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge.
Jamie Nicole McGinley filed a pro se, in forma
pauperis civil-rights complaint. The complaint is before
the Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss the claims
against Defendant but will afford Plaintiff an opportunity to
amend her complaint.
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
states that she was indicted for unlawful transaction with a
minor and was “picked up on this charge [in] July
2018.” Plaintiff’s allegations as to Defendant
Larue County are that after she had been arrested on this
charge and housed at the Taylor County Detention Center,
Larue County officers transported her to Hodgenville. She
next states as follows:
[I] waited to see the judge after being unlawfully prisoned
for five days and for the court records. Court Judge Reed
told me I would be released that day. My charge was amended
and dismissed. However, I did not get out of jail that day.
In fact, I was not released til the following afternoon. I
made countless phone calls to [a friend] to call the court
house. Finally, he had to physically come to the jail to get
me out because the jail simply would not let me out. I lost
time that I can’t get back, money for my vehicle that
was impounded and money at jail for phone calls, also my
relief, Plaintiff asks for $10, 000.
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, this
Court must review the instant action. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Upon review, this
Court must dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines
that the action is “frivolous or malicious, ”
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is
legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in
law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as
frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly
baseless. Id. at 327.
determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the court must construe the complaint
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of
the factual allegations as true. Prater v. City of
Burnside, Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A
complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
“only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would
entitle him to relief.” Brown v. Bargery, 207
F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). While a reviewing court must
liberally construe pro se pleadings, Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), to
avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007).
appears that Plaintiff is alleging that she was
“unlawfully imprisoned for five days” while
waiting to see the judge and “for court records.”
It also appears that Plaintiff is alleging that instead of
being released the same day that the judge dismissed the
charge against her it took until the afternoon of the next
day for her to be released.
§ 1983 claim is made against a municipality, like Larue
County,  a court must analyze two distinct issues:
(1) whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a
constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the
municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120
(1992). The Court will address the issues in reverse order.
municipality cannot be held liable solely because it
employs a tortfeasor – or, in other words, a
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)
(emphasis in original); Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38
F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of
Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994).
“[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is
designed ‘to distinguish acts of the
municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability
is limited to action for which the municipality is actually
responsible.’” City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting
Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986))
(emphasis in Pembaur).
municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional
deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Deaton v.
Montgomery Cty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir.
1993). Simply stated, the plaintiff must “identify the
policy, connect the policy to the city itself and show that
the particular injury was incurred because of the execution
of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police
Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 176 (6th Cir.
1987), overruled on other grounds by Frantz v. Vill. of
Bradford, 245 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2001)). The policy or
custom “must be ‘the moving force of the
constitutional violation’ in order to establish the
liability of a government body under § 1983.”
Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk Cty. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted));
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (indicating that
plaintiff must demonstrate “deliberate conduct”).
has not alleged the existence of a Larue County policy; thus,
the claim ...