United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division, London
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Gregory F. Van Tatenhove United States District Judge.
Doshon Travis is an inmate at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Manchester, Kentucky. Proceeding without a
lawyer, Travis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [R. 1]. This matter is now
before the Court on initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243. See Alexander v. Northern Bureau of
Prisons, 419 Fed.Appx. 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will deny Travis's
2015, Travis pled guilty to possession with the intent to
distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). The trial court then determined
that Travis was a career offender pursuant to section 4B1.1
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) because
he had at least two prior felony convictions involving
controlled substances. As a result, Travis's sentence was
enhanced, and the trial court sentenced him to 192 months in
prison. See United States v. Jermaine Doshon Travis,
No. 0:14-cr-253 (D. Minn. 2015).
filed a direct appeal, and he argued that the trial
court's 192-month sentence based on the career-offender
enhancement was both procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, however, rejected Travis's arguments and
affirmed the judgment of the district court. See United
States v. Jermaine Doshon Travis, 659 Fed.Appx. 368 (8th
has now filed a § 2241 petition with this Court. [R. 1].
Although Travis's petition is difficult to follow, he
appears to be arguing that one of his prior drug convictions
“is overbroad” and, thus, the trial court should
not have counted it as a predicate offense for purposes of
the career-offender enhancement. [R. 1 at 5; R. 1-1 at 8-11].
Ultimately, Travis asks this Court to “vacate [his]
sentence and remand with instruction[s] to resentence [him]
without the career offender enhancement.” [R. 1 at 8].
petition, however, constitutes an impermissible collateral
attack on his sentence. Although a federal prisoner may
challenge the legality of his sentence on direct appeal and
through a timely § 2255 motion, he generally may not do
so in a § 2241 petition. See United States v.
Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining
the distinction between a § 2255 motion and a §
2241 habeas petition). After all, a § 2241 petition is
usually only a vehicle for challenges to actions taken by
prison officials that affect the way the prisoner's
sentence is being carried out, such as computing sentence
credits or determining parole eligibility. See Terrell v.
United States, 564 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009). Simply
put, Travis cannot use a § 2241 petition as a way of
challenging his sentence.
true that, in Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591 (6th
Cir. 2016), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit indicated for the first time that a prisoner may
challenge his sentence in a § 2241 petition. However, in
doing so, the court expressly limited its decision to the
following, narrow circumstances:
(1) prisoners who were sentenced under the mandatory
guidelines regime pre-United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 . . . (2005), (2) who were foreclosed from filing a
successive petition under § 2255, and (3) when a
subsequent, retroactive change in statutory interpretation by
the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is not a
predicate offense for a career-offender enhancement.
Id. at 599-600.
circumstances do not apply in this case. That is because the
trial court sentenced Travis in 2015, well after the Supreme
Court's decision in Booker made the sentencing
guidelines advisory rather than mandatory. On this basis
alone, Travis's petition does not fall within
Hill's limited exception for bringing a §
2241 petition to challenge his federal sentence. See
Loza-Gracia v. Streeval, No. 18-5923 (6th Cir. March 12,
2019) (“Loza-Gracia cannot proceed under Hill
because he was sentenced in 2011, long after the Supreme
Court's January 2005 Booker decision made the
guidelines advisory rather than mandatory.”);
Contreras v. Ormond, No. 18-5020 (6th Cir. Sept. 10,
2018) (“[The petitioner's] case does not fall
within the narrow exception recognized by Hill
because he was sentenced post Booker in 2009, under
the advisory sentencing guidelines.”); Arroyo v.
Ormond, No. 17-5837 (6th Cir. April 6, 2018) (holding
that since the petitioner was sentenced after
Booker, his “claim does not fall within
Hill's limited exception for bringing a §
2241 habeas petition to challenge a federal sentence”).
Thus, Travis's attack on the § 4B1.1 enhancement is
it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Travis's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [R. 1] is
2. This action is DISMISSED and
STRICKEN from the Court's docket; and
3. Judgment in favor of the Respondent shall be entered