Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

United States v. Carter

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville

September 19, 2019

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
v.
QUENTEZ L. CARTER, DEFENDANT

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          Charles R. Simpson III, Senior Judge.

         This matter is before the Court on three motions of Defendant, Quentez L. Carter (hereinafter “Carter” or “Defendant”), [1] for (1) a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) and suppression of evidence seized from 1457 Beech Street, Louisville, Kentucky, (DN 30); (2) suppression of evidence seized from 5538 Bruce Avenue, Louisville, Kentucky, (DN 36); and (3) suppression of evidence seized from Defendant or, in the alternative, dismissal of the indictment of this criminal action, (DN 35). For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the first and second motions. The Court will hold the third motion in abeyance in order to permit the filing of an omitted document.

         I. Motion for Franks Hearing and to suppress evidence seized from 1457 Beech Street (DN 30)

         Carter’s motion lacks the essential elements to entitle him to a Franks Hearing. To demonstrate entitlement to a Franks hearing a defendant must (1) “make[] a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, ” and (2) establish that “the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.” United States v. Green, 572 F.App'x 438, 441 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 505 (6th Cir. 2001)). “A defendant who challenges the veracity of statements made in an affidavit that formed the basis for a warrant has a heavy burden.” United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990).

         “The first prong of the Franks analysis (whether the defendant has made a substantial preliminary showing of intentional or reckless falsity) is a factual question.” Green, 572 F.App'x at 441 (citations omitted). If a defendant makes this substantial preliminary showing, the court turns to the second prong of the Franks analysis by removing the allegedly false statement and asking whether the search warrant affidavit still supports a finding of probable cause. Graham, 275 F.3d at 505. The second prong of the Franks analysis (whether an allegedly false statement is necessary to finding probable cause) is a legal question. Id. Probable cause exists if the remaining portions of the affidavit provide the court “with a basis for finding that there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found.” Id. at 504. In this case, Defendant’s motion fails to meet either prong of the Franks analysis.

         A. Franks’ first prong

         Defendant fails to meet Franks’ first prong because he does not make (1) a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was made in the affidavit or (2) demonstrate that the statement was made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth. The Sixth Circuit’s “well-settled framework for Franks hearings requires a defendant to point to specific false statements and then accompany his allegations with an offer of proof.” Green, 572 F.App'x at 442 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Carter points to a specific, “patently false” statement within the affidavit (“Detective … determined that Quentez Lamont Carter has resided at 1457 Beech Street”), (DN 30, p. 3), but fails to “accompany his allegations with an offer of proof.” Cummins, 912 F.2d at 103. Because Carter does not make an offer of proof to support his claim that a statement was “patently false, ” he fails to make the “showing” of falsity that is prerequisite to qualifying for a Franks hearing.

         Defendant’s promise to make a future offer of proof as to the falsity of a statement within the affidavit is inadequate to receive a Franks hearing. Carter asserts that can make a future showing of the statement’s falsity because he “has reliable witnesses, and other evidence, to show that he did not reside” at the Beech Street address. (DN 30, p. 1). However, even supposing Defendant could make a showing of the statement’s falsity in the future, his motion still fails because Franks requires a defendant to make such a showing preliminary to the receipt of a hearing. Simply claiming that he can produce witnesses and evidence at a hearing, should the court grant one, is, by definition, not “preliminary.” Finally, even if arguendo the Court accepts that a statement within the affidavit was “patently false, ” Defendant’s motion still lacks merit because he provides no evidence that the false statement was made “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for its truth.” Green, 572 F.App'x at 441.

         B. Franks’ second prong

         Additionally, Carter’s motion fails to meet Franks’ second prong because Defendant does not argue that, on its face, the affidavit lacks probable cause absent the alleged false statement. An affidavit, with the false statement removed, will still establish probable cause if it “provide[s] the magistrate judge with a basis for finding there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found at’ the stated location.” Graham, 275 F.3d at 504. Here, Defendant fails to address the probable cause of the affidavit at all. Instead, Carter asserts that at an evidentiary hearing, he “will demonstrate … the lack of probable cause.” (DN 30, p. 1–2) (emphasis added). Because Defendant has failed to meet the probable cause element of Franks’ second prong, he is not entitled to Franks hearing.

         C. Motion to suppress because of “other errors”

         Defendant also moves the Court to suppress evidence seized from 1457 Beech Street “since the affidavit contains other errors.” (DN 30, p. 1). A bald allegation that a search warrant affidavit contains “other errors, ” without more, does not entitle a defendant to suppression of evidence. For the same reasons outlined above, such allegations also do not satisfy the preliminary showing required to obtain a Franks hearing. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from 1457 Beech Street will be denied.

         II. Motion to suppress evidence seized from 5538 Bruce Avenue (DN 36)

         Defendant contends that evidence seized from 5538 Bruce Avenue[2] should be suppressed because the search warrant lacked probable cause. (DN 36). This argument is without merit. The Fourth Amendment states that “no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation....” U.S. Const. amend. IV. To demonstrate probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant, an affidavit must contain facts that indicate “a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be located on the premises of the proposed search.” United States v. Jenkins, 396 F.3d 751, 760 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 930 (6th Cir. 1990)). “Probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances; it is a practical, non-technical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life.” United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 571 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Frazier, ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.