United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
M. Hood, Judge
matter is before the Court on Defendant John Guzman's
motion, [DE 121], styled a motion for to reconsider this
Court's Order, [DE 118], denying his motion for
“reduction in sentence” under the First Step Act.
[DE 114]. Having reviewed Guzman's motion, and being
otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS
ORDERED that Guzman's motion to reconsider is
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
November 18, 2016, after a one-week jury trial, Guzman was
found guilty on nine counts of bank fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1344(1). [DE 42]. On February 21, 2017, Guzman
was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifty (50) months
on each of the nine counts to run concurrently. [DE 60].
is currently serving his sentence at Federal Medical Center
(“FMC”) in Lexington, Kentucky. [Id.].
Guzman is 73 years old and has served more than 50 percent of
21, 2019, Guzman requested this Court grant him early
release,  claiming there are “extraordinary
and compelling” reasons to do so under the First Step
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). [DE 114 at 1-6, PageID
#1661-66]. In the alternative, he requested early release to
home detention under the “Second Chance Act, ” 34
U.S.C. § 60541(g), which allows early release to home
detention for elderly and terminally ill offenders.
[Id. at 6-7, PageID #1166-67].
28, 2019, this Court directed the United States to respond to
Guzman's motion. [DE 115]. The United States having now
responded, [DE 116], and Guzman having replied in support of
his motion, [DE 117].
Court ordered the motion be denied. [DE 118]. In particular,
the Court denied Guzman's request for early release
because it was not brought by the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons nor had Guzman exhausted his administrative remedies.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see
also, Engle v. United States, 26 Fed.Appx. 394,
397 (6th Cir. 2001); [DE 118 at 4-5, PageID #1693-94]. The
Court next denied Guzman's request for early release to
home detention because the Court was without the authority to
do so under 34 U.S.C. § 60541, which provides such
authority only to the Attorney General. [DE 118 at 6-7,
argues the Court should reconsider its denial, [DE 118], of
his motion for early release, [DE 114], because he believes
that he has now exhausted his administrative remedies. As a
result, Guzman believes he is entitled to early release. We
Guzman supports his motion to reconsider by citing to a rule
of procedure that does not exist. [DE 121]. In particular,
Guzman cites to “Rule 59(e)” in the styling of
his motion to reconsider. [Id.]. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 59 goes no further than subsection (b)(3),
and relates to matters before magistrate judges.
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for motions
to reconsider. Thus, “[c]ourts adjudicating motions to
reconsider in criminal cases typically evaluate such motions
under the same standards applicable to a civil motion to
alter or amend judgment pursuant to Fed. R.C iv. P.
59(e).” United States v. Willyard, No.
3:07-CR-44, 2008 WL 471683, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Feb.19, 2008)
Court has held “the purpose of a motion to alter or
amend judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) is to have the court
reconsider matters properly encompassed in a decision on the
merits.” United States v. Smith, Case No.
3:08-cr-31-JMH, 2012 WL 1802554, *1 (E.D. Ky. May 2012)
(quoting Sherwood v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 290
F.Supp.2d 856, 858 (N.D.Ohio 2003) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). This Court has further stated that
[G]ives the district court the power to rectify its own
mistakes ...Generally, three situations justify a district
court altering or amending its judgment: (1) to accommodate
an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for
new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a
clear error of law or to prevent a manifest injustice. It is
not designed to give an unhappy ...