Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

McCoy v. Cambridge Franchise Holdings, LLC

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

September 10, 2019

MARY J. MCCOY PLAINTIFF
v.
CAMBRIDGE FRANCHISE HOLDINGS, LLC; and NASHVILLE QUALITY, LLC DEFENDANTS

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          Greg N. Stivers, Chief United States District Judge.

         This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Stay Action Pending Arbitration (DN 10). The motion is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons provided below, the motion is GRANTED.

         I. BACKGROUND

         Plaintiff Mary J. McCoy (“Plaintiff”) originally filed this action in Jefferson Circuit Court alleging Defendants Cambridge Franchise Holdings, LLC and Nashville Quality, LLC (collectively “Defendants”) violated Kentucky and federal law with respect to their employment practices at the Burger King restaurant where she formerly worked. (Comp. ¶ 1, DN 1-1). In the present motion, Defendants move to either dismiss this action or to stay its resolution pending arbitration based on an arbitration agreement (“Agreement”) which Defendants contend Plaintiff signed electronically. (Defs.' Mot. Compel Arbitration 1, DN 10; Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel Arbitration 1, DN 11 [hereinafter Defs.' Mem.]). The Agreement provides, in relevant part:

Any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or relating to your employment with the Company, any employment agreement or contract between you and the conditions and terms of your employment with the Company, the termination of your employment with the Company, all events related thereto, this Agreement, and any other controversy, dispute or claim between you and the Company, its parent entities, subsidiaries and affiliates (and its and their current and former members, partners, officers, directors, employees and agents, whether acting in their individual capacity or their capacity on behalf of the Company or its parent entities, subsidiaries and affiliates), shall be settled by final and binding arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association . . . in accordance with its Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures . . . that are in effect at the time the mediation commences.

(Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Compel Arbitration Ex. A, at 1, DN 11-1 [hereinafter Arbitration Agreement]). Defendants contend “Plaintiff's agreement and assent to this document is demonstrated on the bottom of each page, where it reads that the document was ‘Digitally signed by Mary McCoy on 6/18/2018 2:11PM.'” (Def.'s Mem. 2).

         In support of her response, Plaintiff submits her affidavit asserting that, “never, at any time during [her] employment with the Defendants, [did she] sign[]-electronically, digitally, or otherwise-any arbitration agreement . . . .” (Pl.'s Resp. Defs.' Mot. Compel Arbitration Ex. A. ¶ 3, DN 15-1). Defendants contend this allegation is immaterial, however, “because arbitration agreements need not even be signed to be enforceable.” (Defs.' Reply Mot. Compel Arbitration 3, DN 16).

         II. JURISDICTION

         This Court has jurisdiction based on federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

         III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, courts apply the summary judgment standard in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Arnold v. Rent-a-Center, Inc., No. 11-18-JBC, 2011 WL 1810145, at *2 (E.D. Ky. May 12, 2011) (“This court will treat the motion to compel arbitration as one for summary judgment . . . .”); Weddle Enters., Inc. v. Treviicos-Soletanche, J.V., No. 1:14CV-00061-JHM, 2014 WL 5242904, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 15, 2014) (“A motion to dismiss based on the existence of a valid arbitration agreement is not evaluated under the usual Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard. Instead, courts apply the standard applicable to motions for summary judgment.” (citations omitted)). “In order to show that the validity of the agreement is in issue, the party opposing arbitration must show a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate, a showing that mirrors the summary judgment standard.” Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 889 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         IV. DISCUSSION

         Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, a written agreement to arbitrate involving a dispute arising out of a contract involving interstate commerce “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).

When considering a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration under the Act, a court has four tasks: first, it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; second, it must determine the scope of that agreement; third, if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the action are ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.