United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
REBECCA GRADY JENNINGS, DISTRICT JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
Drashawn Bartlett brings this action against Defendants
Correct Care Solutions (“CCS”) in its official
capacity as health care provider at Luther Luckett
Correctional Complex (“LLCC”), Renae Barbes, Jeff
Ingram, Courtney O'Hern,  and Daniel Oldaker, all in their
individual capacity as employees of CCS. [DE 1]. Mr. Bartlett
alleges that while in custody at Luther Luckett Correctional
Complex (âLLCCâ) he suffered from Defendants' deliberate
indifference to his medical needs. CCS has moved to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). [DE 4]. Briefing is
complete, and this matter is ripe. For the reasons below, the
Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
factual allegations set forth in the complaint are taken as
true for the present motion. See Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Bartlett was incarcerated at Luther Luckett Correctional
Complex (“LLCC”). [DE 4 at 4, ¶ 11]. At that
time, Correct Care Solutions was a private healthcare
provider contracted by the Commonwealth of Kentucky to
provide health care services to patients located at LLCC.
[Id. at 3, ¶ 3]. On February 22, Mr. Bartlett
dislocated his left index finger and he requested to be taken
to the hospital for an x-ray. [Id. at 4-5,
¶¶ 12-13]. Mr. Bartlett alleges that Defendant
Oldaker, a CCS employee, told Mr. Bartlett that he would not
be taken to the hospital, because “his situation was
not ‘life or death.'” [Id. at 5,
¶ 13]. Defendant Oldaker instead advised Mr. Bartlett to
“apply ice to the injured area.” [Id. at
5, ¶ 14].
next day Mr. Bartlett again requested medical attention, and
an unknown CCS employee “advised Mr. Bartlett that he
would not be seen because an order for a hand consultation
was already pending.” [Id. at 5, ¶ 16].
Mr. Bartlett explained that the pending consultation order
was for an unrelated injury to his right hand and that he had
received no medical treatment for his injured index finger.
[Id. at 5, ¶ 17]. His request for treatment was
again denied. [Id.].
February 24, Mr. Bartlett filed a grievance with LLCC, citing
deficient medical treatment and requesting “[o]utside
medical treatment to save [his] finger.” [Id.
at 5, ¶ 18 (alterations in original)]. That day, two CCS
nurses, Defendants Barbes and O'Hern, examined Mr.
Bartlett. [Id. at 5-6, ¶ 19]. Defendant
O'Hern, noted that Mr. Bartlett had “not yet been
seen, ” and contacted Defendant Ingram, a CCS on-call
provider. [Id. at 6, ¶ 19]. In accordance with
Defendant Ingram's advice, a split was applied to Mr.
Bartlett's injured finger, and Defendant Barbes made the
following note in Mr. Bartlett's chart: “Will relay
to oncoming shift to assess [Mr. Bartlett's] hand daily
until able to be seen by provider.” [Id. at 6,
¶¶ 19-20 (alteration in original)].
Bartlett alleges that CCS staff did not check on his injury
daily, although the finger was x-rayed “several days
later” and revealed that Mr. Bartlett was suffering
from a “subluxation of unspecified interphalangeal
joint of left index finger.” [Id. at 6,
¶¶ 21-22]. In April 2017, nearly two months later,
an outside hand specialist examined Mr. Bartlett and he
received surgery to treat his injured finger. [Id.
at 6, ¶¶ 23, 25]. According to the Complaint,
“[t]he surgical procedure would not have been necessary
had the Defendant's [sic] provided Mr. Bartlett with
timely and adequate medical treatment.” [Id.
at 6, ¶ 25].
Bartlett then filed this Complaint, naming CCS as a defendant
“in its official capacity as health care
provider” of LLCC and naming Renae Barbes, Jeff Ingram,
Courtney Ohern, and Daniel Oldaker (the “Individual
Defendants”) in their individual capacities as
employees of CCS. [Id. at 1]. The Complaint alleges
that Defendants violated Mr. Bartlett's Eighth Amendment
rights and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Id. at 7,
¶¶ 28-29]. CCS moved to dismiss. Mr. Bartlett
responded [DE 9], and CCS filed its Reply, [DE 10]. The
Individual Defendants have not joined this Motion to Dismiss
or filed independent motions to dismiss, but have filed an
answer, [DE 22], foreclosing their ability to file a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Pfeifer v.
Correctcare-Integrated Health, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO.
5:15-CV-7-TBR, 2018 WL 1863596, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 18,
2018) (“It is axiomatic that the filing of a responsive
pleading forecloses a defendant's opportunity and ability
to file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
court must dismiss a complaint if it “fail[s] to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). To state a claim, a complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
When considering a motion to dismiss, courts must presume all
factual allegations in the complaint to be true and make all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). “But the district court need not
accept a bare assertion of legal conclusions.”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (citation omitted).
“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal citation and quotation omitted).
survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Traverse Bay
Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep't of
Educ., 615 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A claim becomes plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “A
complaint will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if no
law supports the claims made, if the facts alleged are
insufficient to state a claim, or if the face of the
complaint presents an insurmountable bar to relief.”
Southfield Educ. Ass'n v. Southfield Bd. of
Educ., 570 Fed.Appx. 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561-64).
28 U.S.C. § 1983, “[e]very person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured.” To state a viable § 1983 claim, a
plaintiff must allege: (1) the depravation of a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Federal Constitution or