ON
REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO. 2017-CA-000480-MR
MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT NO. 15-CI-00280
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Charles William Gorham The Law Offices
of Charles W. Gorham
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: Donnie James Niehaus Walter A. Ward
Ward, Hocker & Thornton, PLLC
OPINION
BUCKINGHAM, JUSTICE
Appellant
Geoffrey Hampton filed a workers' compensation
enforcement action in the Muhlenberg Circuit Court against
his employer, Intech Contracting, LLC, and its workers'
compensation insurance carrier, Zurich American Insurance
Company (collectively, Intech/Zurich). The circuit court
entered an order granting Hampton's third, fourth, and
fifth motions for partial summary judgment.
Intech/Zurich
appealed, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of
the portion of the order granting Hampton's fourth motion
for partial summary judgment as an appeal from an
interlocutory order, but it refused to dismiss the remainder
of the appeal. Rather, it reversed the portion of the circuit
court's order granting summary judgment to Hampton on his
third and fifth partial summary judgment motions and directed
the circuit court to dismiss Hampton's claims relating to
those two motions on the grounds that the circuit court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Hampton
moved for our discretionary review of the portion of the
Court of Appeals opinion reversing the circuit court's
order granting him partial summary judgment on his third and
fifth motions for partial summary judgment. Intech/Zurich did
not move for our review of the portion of the Court of
Appeals opinion dismissing its appeal of the portion of the
circuit court's order granting Hampton's fourth
motion for partial summary judgment.
We
agree that the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the appeal
from the circuit court's order granting partial summary
judgment to Hampton on his fourth partial summary judgment
motion as being an appeal from a nonfinal
order.[1] However, we conclude the Court of Appeals
erred in not dismissing the Intech/Zurich appeal from the
portion of the circuit court's order granting summary
judgment to Hampton on his third and fifth motions for
partial summary judgment as also being an appeal from a
nonfinal order. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in
part.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On
September 9, 2009, Hampton suffered a severe workplace injury
which resulted in multiple severe injuries, including a
below-the-knee amputation, a C2 fracture with spinal cord
injury, a C6 level ASIA-C tetraplegia, multiple spinal
fractures, lower extremity deep vein thrombosis, traumatic
brain injury, a vocal cord injury, fractured teeth, and
underlying anxiety related to the multiple injuries. As a
result of these injuries, Hampton filed a workers'
compensation claim wherein he was awarded permanent total
disability benefits and future medical benefits related to
his injuries, including certain specific benefits applicable
to his specific injuries.
According
to Hampton, notwithstanding his entitlement to the awarded
benefits, Intech/Zurich has consistently failed to timely
approve medical treatment, reimburse his out-of-pocket
expenses, or pay him the correct amount of past due principal
and interest for his income benefits. The validity of
Hampton's claim is supported by the fact the Department
of Workers' Claims opened an Unfair Claims Settlement
investigation that resulted in Zurich agreeing to pay a civil
penalty of $18, 500.
On
August 5, 2015, Hampton filed a workers' compensation
enforcement action in the Muhlenberg Circuit Court against
Intech/Zurich, alleging that Intech/Zurich had failed to
timely pay certain medical benefits to which he was entitled.
As authority for his filing, Hampton cited KRS[2] 342.305, which
provides as follows:
Any party in interest may file in the Circuit Court of the
county in which the injury occurred a certified copy of a
memorandum of agreement approved by the administrative law
judge, or of an order or decision of the administrative law
judge or board, or of an award of the administrative law
judge unappealed from, or of an award of the board rendered
upon an appeal whether or not there is a motion to reopen or
review pending under KRS 342.125. The court shall render
judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties. Such
judgment shall have the same effect, and all proceedings in
relation thereto shall thereafter be the same as though it
had been rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by that
court. Any such judgment, unappealed from or affirmed on
appeal or modified in obedience to the mandate of the Court
of Appeals, shall be modified to conform to any decision of
the administrative law judge ending, diminishing, or
increasing any weekly payment under the provisions of KRS
342.125 upon a presentation to it of a certified copy of such
decision.
Hampton's
complaint alleged that on October 6, 2014, he had received a
workers' compensation award entitling him to income and
medical benefits; that Intech/Zurich was obligated to pay for
those benefits; that Intech/Zurich had "failed to pay
all benefits awarded and found compensable"; that
Intech/Zurich had "failed to approve all medical
treatment found compensable in the opinion, award and order
rendered on October 6, 2014"; and that he was seeking
enforcement of Intech/Zurich's obligations to pay for
those benefits, along with an award of attorney's fees.
Thereafter,
through a succession of motions for partial summary judgment,
Hampton made a variety of piecemeal enforcement requests. By
order dated March 6, 2017, the circuit court granted
Hampton's third, fourth, and fifth motions for partial
summary judgment[3] and ordered as follows: an award directing
payment for the cost of a power wheelchair (third motion); an
award of past-due income benefits in the amount of $6, 579.59
for the underpayment of past permanent total disability
benefits plus interest (fourth motion); and an award of $1,
884.68 for the reimbursement of expenses for a
medically-related trip to Oklahoma (fifth motion).
Significantly, the order does not contain CR[4] 54.02 finality
language. Furthermore, the order did not resolve all the
issues between all the parties because Hampton's claim
for attorney fees remained pending. Therefore, the order was
by definition an interlocutory order, and it also lacked CR
54.02 finality language.
After
Intech/Zurich filed its appeal in the Court of Appeals,
Hampton filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the circuit
court's order was interlocutory and did not contain CR
54.02 finality language. The Court of Appeals agreed that the
underpayment of benefits aspect of the appeal was
interlocutory as Hampton's complaint in the circuit court
had claimed attorney fees and that claim remained pending.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed that aspect of the
appeal pursuant to CR 54.02 because the order appealed from
did not resolve all the issues between all the parties and
did not contain the necessary finality language.
The
Court of Appeals concluded relative to the circuit
court's granting of Hampton's third and fifth motions
for partial summary judgment, however, that the
"[Intech/Zurich] argument that the circuit court was
acting outside the scope of its subject matter jurisdiction
in this type of context was the functional equivalent of
asserting an absolute immunity defense, the denial of which
was subject to interlocutory review." Thus, the Court of
Appeals held that although the circuit court order was
interlocutory and otherwise did not comply with CR 54.02, it
(the Court of Appeals) nevertheless had jurisdiction to
address the issues concerning Hampton's third and fifth
partial summary judgment motions under the absolute immunity
doctrine that permits a party to immediately appeal from a
ruling that the party is not entitled to immunity.
The
Court of Appeals reasoned that "the circuit court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to approve Hampton's requests
for a camouflaged power wheelchair with all-terrain tires (as
set forth in his third motion for summary judgment) and
reimbursement for mileage and other costs associated with his
November 2015 trip to Tahlequah, Oklahoma (as set forth in
his fifth motion for partial summary judgment)." It
stated, "Neither of those expenses were approved in
Hampton's award, and they were required to be approved,
in the first instance, by the ALJ."
Hampton's
motion for discretionary review, which we granted, followed.
II.
THE CIRCUIT COURT'S MARCH 6, 2017 ORDER WAS A NONFINAL
ORDER THAT DOES NOT ...