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Getty v. Getty

Supreme Court of Kentucky

August 29, 2019

RICHARD A. GETTY, RICHARD A. GETTY, AS TRUSTEE AND BENEFICIARY OF THE MARCH 22, 2004 RICHARD J. GETTY LIVING TRUST, RICHARD A. GETTY, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, TRUSTEE AND BENEFICIARY OF THE MARCH 22, 2004 LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF RICHARD J. GETTY, RICHARD A. GETTY, AS BENEFICIARY OF THE ESTATE OF RICHARD J. GETTY, RICHARD A. GETTY, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF RICHARD J. GETTY, SESAMIE BRADSHAW, SESAMIE BRADSHAW, AS BENEFICIARY OF THE MARCH 22, 2004 RICHARD J. GETTY LIVING TRUST, SESAMIE BRADSHAW, AS BENEFICIARY OF THE MARCH 22, 2004 LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF RICHARD J. GETTY, ERROL COOPER, AS TRUSTEE OF THE MARCH 22, 2004 RICHARD J. GETTY LIVING TRUST AND ERROL COOPER, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND TRUSTEE OF THE MARCH 22, 2004 LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF RICHARD J. GETTY APPELLANTS
v.
BRENDA SUE BRIDGES GETTY, BRENDA SUE BRIDGES GETTY, AS TRUSTEE AND BENEFICIARY OF THE MARCH 22, 2004 RICHARD J. GETTY LIVING TRUST, INCLUDING AS AMENDED ON OCTOBER 24, 2008, BRENDA SUE BRIDGES GETTY, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, TRUSTEE AND BENEFICIARY OF THE MARCH 22, 2004 LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF RICHARD. J. GETTY, BRENDA SUE BRIDGES GETTY, AS EXECUTRIX AND BENEFICIARY UNDER THE OCTOBER 27, 2008 LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF RICHARD J. GETTY, BRENDA SUE BRIDGES GETTY, AS GRANTEE UNDER THE OCTOBER 27, 2008 DEED TURST TRANSACTION, BRENDA SUE BRIDGES GETTY, AS GRANTEE OF THE OCTOBER 27, 2008 GRANT DEED, BRENDA SUE BRIDGES GETTY, AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF RICHARD J. GETTY UNDER THE FEBRUARY 23, 2004 POWER OF ATTORNEY AND UNDER THE OCTOBER 24, 2008 GENERAL DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY, CAROLYN CARROWAY, CAROLYN CARROWAY, AS TRUSTEE OF THE OCTOBER 27, 2008 DEED TRUST, JOSEPH MAYER, AS TRUSTEE OF THE MARCH 22, 2004 RICHARD J. GETTY LIVING RUST AS AMENDED ON OCTOBER 27, 2008, JOSPEH AS EXECUTOR OF THE OCTOBER 27, 2008 LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF RICHARD J. GETTY, JOSEPH MAYER, AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF RICHARD J. GETTY UNDER THE OCOTBER 24, 2008 GENERAL DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY AND KEVAN MORGAN APPELLEES

          ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS CASE NOS. 2014-CA-000686, 2014-CA-000693, 2014-CA-000711, 2014-CA-0764 BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT NOS. 09-CI-00476, 10-CI-00424

          COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: John W. Bilby William M. Lear, Jr. Anthony Joseph Phelps Stoll Keenon Ogden, PLLC

          COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: Gregory Jackson Mark L. Moseley Erin Celeste Sammons IZZO Leslie Patterson Vose Landrum & Shouse, LLP

          OPINION

          MINTON CHIEF JUSTICE

         A circuit court jury rendered a verdict in favor of the contestants in this will-contest case, but the Court of Appeals reversed, in part, the resulting judgment because the appellate panel found the contestants' evidence at trial insufficient to support the jury's verdict. On discretionary review, we reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the jury's verdict on the will- contest issues because we hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to apply the appropriate standard of appellate review of the trial court's denial of the will-proponent's directed-verdict motion. We otherwise affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals on other issues raised, and we remand this case to the Court of Appeals to resolve the remaining issues raised on appeal but not addressed in its opinion.

         I. BACKGROUND.

         Richard J. Getty ("Dick") and Sue Getty married in 1983, and Sue became stepmother to Dick's adult biological children, Richard A. Getty ("Rich") and Yolanda Richardson. Yolanda, who predeceased Dick, was the mother of Sesamie Bradshaw.[1]

         In 2004, Dick executed a will and a living trust agreement ("2004 Estate Plan"). The gist of the 2004 Estate Plan divided Dick's estate evenly among Sue, Rich, and Yolanda in one-third shares.

         In late October 2008, Dick executed another will and some deeds, which rearranged ownership in certain real property (collectively the "2008 Estate Plan"), the validity of all of which is disputed in this case. Under the 2008 Estate Plan, Sue inherited by will or otherwise succeeded in ownership to everything Dick owned except for a $1.00 bequest each to Rich and Yolanda.

         Upon Dick's death on December 28, 2009, Rich and Sesamie sued Sue, seeking to invalidate the 2008 Estate Plan. Rich and Sesamie also claimed that for a considerable period before Dick's death Sue systematically misappropriated funds from the income stream of one of Dick's properties that he had placed in trust in the 2004 Estate Plan. Finally, Rich and Sesamie brought a claim of wrongful death against Sue, alleging that Sue caused or contributed to Dick's death.

         The jury found the 2008 Estate Plan to be invalid, thereby resurrecting the provisions of the 2004 Estate Plan.[2] The jury also found that Sue misappropriated funds and arrived at a monetary amount to be paid to Rich and Yolanda. But the jury did not find Sue liable for wrongful death. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdicts.

         On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the jury's invalidation of the 2008 Estate Plan, finding insufficient evidence to support the verdict. The Court of Appeals also reversed the jury's verdict that held Sue liable for the misappropriation of funds. The jury's finding on the wrongful-death claim was not appealed.

         II. ANALYSIS.

         A. The trial court did not err in denying Sue's motions for directed verdict on Rich and Sesamie's claims that Dick did not have the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the 2008 Estate Plan and that Sue exercised undue influence over Dick in his execution of that plan.

         The first issue we address is whether the trial court erred when it denied Sue's motion for a directed verdict on Rich and Sesamie's claim that Dick lacked testamentary capacity to execute the 2008 Estate Plan. The second issue is whether the trial court erred when it denied Sue's motion for directed verdict on Rich and Sesamie's claim that Sue exercised undue influence over Dick in his execution of the 2008 plan.

         After the trial court denied these motions for directed verdict, the case was submitted to the jury, and the jury found in favor of Rich and Sesamie on both claims. Before this Court, Sue argues that the Court of Appeals' opinion correctly reversed the portion of the judgment that reflected the jury's verdict, arguing that insufficient evidence supported it.

         Trial evidence concerning these issues overlaps, so we analyze them both here, even though the resolution of one of them has the same effect as resolution of the other-either a finding of lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence over the testator ends in nullification of the 2008 Estate Plan and revival of the 2004 Estate Plan.

         We first note the highly deferential standard of review we apply in evaluating jury verdicts for sufficiency of the evidence:

Upon review of the evidence supporting a judgment entered upon a jury verdict, the role of an appellate court is limited to determining whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion for directed verdict. All evidence which favors the prevailing party must be taken as true and the reviewing court is not at liberty to determine credibility or the weight which should be given to the evidence, these being functions reserved to the trier of fact. The prevailing party is entitled to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Upon completion of such an evidentiary review, the appellate court must determine whether the verdict is "'palpably or flagrantly' against the evidence so as 'to indicate that it was reached as a result of passion or prejudice."'[3]

         To execute a valid will, the testator must have testamentary capacity. Former Chief Justice Robert F. Stephens summarized Kentucky law on the testamentary-capacity issue in Bye v. Mattingly:

In Kentucky there is a strong presumption in favor of a testator possessing adequate testamentary capacity. This presumption can only be rebutted by the strongest showing of incapacity. Testamentary capacity is only relevant at the time of execution of a will. Thus any order purporting to render a person per se unable to dispose of property by will is void ab initio, as such a ruling on testamentary capacity would be premature. This is not to say that such an order is irrelevant, but rather it is not dispositive of the issue of testamentary capacity.
"Kentucky is committed to the doctrine of testatorial absolutism." The practical effect of this doctrine is that the privilege of the citizens of the Commonwealth to draft wills to dispose of their property is zealously guarded by the courts and will not be disturbed based on remote or speculative evidence. The degree of mental capacity required to make a will is minimal. The minimum level of mental capacity required to make a will is less than that necessary to make a deed or a contract.[4]
To validly execute a will, a testator must: (1) know the natural objects of her bounty; (2) know her obligations to them; (3) know the character and value of her estate; and (4) dispose of her estate according to her own fixed purpose. Merely being an older person, possessing a failing memory, momentary forgetfulness, weakness of mental powers or lack of strict coherence in conversation does not render one incapable of validly executing a will. "Every man possessing the requisite mental powers may dispose of his property by will in any way he may desire, and a jury will not be permitted to overthrow it, and to make a will for him to accord with their ideas of justice and propriety."
. . . While a ruling of total or partial disability certainly is evidence of a lack of testamentary capacity, it is certainly not dispositive of the issue. This Court has upheld the rights of those afflicted with a variety of illnesses to execute valid wills. We have not disturbed the testatorial privileges of those who believed in witchcraft, spiritualism, or atheism. . . . [T]his Court has always taken the broadest possible view of who may execute a will no matter what their infirmity. . . .
When a testator is suffering from a mental illness which ebbs and flows in terms of its effect on the testator's mental competence, it is presumed that the testator was mentally fit when the will was executed. This is commonly referred to as the lucid interval doctrine. . . .
The lucid interval doctrine is only implicated when there is evidence that a testator is suffering from a mental illness; otherwise the normal presumption in favor of testamentary capacity is operating. The burden is placed upon those who seek to overturn the will to demonstrate the lack of capacity. The presumption created is a rebuttable one, so that evidence which demonstrates conclusively that the testator lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will results in nullifying the will.[5]

         Similar to a lack of testamentary capacity nullifying a will, undue influence over the testator in the testator's execution of a will invalidates that will. As before, we endorse former Chief Justice Stephens's articulation of Kentucky law regarding undue influence:

Undue influence is a level of persuasion which destroys the testator's free will and replaces it with the desires of the influencer. In discerning whether influence on a given testator is "undue", courts must examine both the nature and the extent of the influence. First, the influence must be of a type which is inappropriate. Influence from acts of kindness, appeals to feeling, or arguments addressed to the understanding of the testator are permissible. Influence from threats, coercion and the like are improper and not permitted by the law. Second, the influence must be of a level that vitiates the testator's own free will so that the testator is disposing of her property in a manner that she would otherwise refuse to do. The essence of this inquiry is whether the testator is exercising her own judgment.
In addition to demonstrating that undue influence was exercised upon the testator, a contestant must also show influence prior to or during the execution of the will. Undue influence exercised after the execution of the will has no bearing whatsoever upon whether the testator disposed of her property according to her own wishes.

         The influence must operate upon the testator at the execution of the will. If the influence did not affect the testator, then such conduct is irrelevant. However, even if the influence occurred many years prior to the execution of the will, but operates upon the testator at the time of execution, it is improper and will render the will null and void.

To determine whether a will reflects the wishes of the testator, the court must examine the indicia or badges of undue influence. Such badges include a physically weak and mentally impaired testator, a will which is unnatural in its provisions, a recently developed and comparatively short period of close relationship between the testator and principal beneficiary, participation by the principal beneficiary in the preparation of the will, possession of the will by the principal beneficiary after it was reduced to writing, efforts by the principal beneficiary to restrict contacts between the testator and the natural objects of his bounty, and absolute control of testator's business affairs.
When a contestant seeks to claim that undue influence was employed upon a testator, the burden is upon the contestant to demonstrate the existence and effect of the influence. Merely demonstrating that the opportunity to exert such influence [existed] is not sufficient to sustain the burden of proof. When undue influence and a mentally impaired testator are both alleged and the mental impairment of the testator is proven, the level of undue influence which must be shown is less than would normally be required since the testator is in a weakened state.
There is a presumption which [may have] some potential application to the instant case. In those instances in which a will is grossly unreasonable and the principal beneficiary actively participated in its execution, a presumption of undue influence arises. If the contestant can offer evidence of such activities, then the burden of persuasion shifts to the proponents of the will, but it does not relieve the contestants of the continuing burden of proof.[6]

         The evidence presented by Rich and Sesamie to prove Dick's lack of testamentary capacity to execute the 2008 Estate Plan can be placed into two main categories: (1) medical evidence calling into question Dick's mental capacity and (2) evidence suggesting undue influence on the part of Sue. While the medical evidence presented by Rich and Sesamie arguably calls into question the existence of all the requisite elements of testamentary capacity, the element called most into question by the totality of the evidence submitted is the fourth one-that Dick "dispose[d] of h[is] estate according to h[is] own fixed purpose."[7]

         As our caselaw explains, ["[T]he court parallels its requirement of the testator's 'fixed judgment or settled purpose of his own' with a requirement of a mind in a proper state for disposing of his estate with reason. We interpret the test to mean simply that the testator must be capable of producing a document which at the time represents his own will or, examined synthetically rather than analytically, that the testator's mind must be such as to be capable of producing an instrument which is his own, and not that of someone else."[8] In applying that test, this Court in Bishop examined whether the will was "reasonable" and whether "it is . . . claimed to be the product of any undue influence exercise over the testat[or]."[9] So evidence of undue influence is relevant both in examining whether the testator lacked testamentary capacity to execute a will and whether another individual unduly influenced that testator in the execution of a will.

         "It is well settled law that, like other species of fraud, influence that results in the execution of a will which is not in truth the free expression and desire of the maker may be proved by a chain of circumstances. Ordinarily that is the case; often of necessity."[10] "All that can be done is to prove certain acts and facts, and it is from these, when connected into a composite whole, that the evidence of undue influence is made to appear."[11] "[W]hen slight evidence of the exercise of undue influence and the lack of mental capacity is coupled with evidence of an unequal or unnatural disposition, it is enough to take the case to the jury."[12]

         Rich and Sesamie presented medical evidence suggesting that Dick was not in his normal state of mind when he executed the 2008 Estate Plan. Dr. Stephen Raffle, an expert witness called by Rich and Sesamie, testified that, after spending "over 200 hours" reviewing voluminous information about Dick's medical condition, in his medical opinion as a forensic psychiatrist, Dick was "physically weak and mentally impaired" at the time that he executed the 2008 Estate Plan. The record also documents a large amount of medication Dick was taking for his ailments. These medications included narcotics.

         On October 27, 2008, the day of the execution of the 2008 Estate Plan, Dick was taking narcotic medications, as had been prescribed for quite some time. According to another medical expert presented by Rich and Sesamie, Dr. Robert J. Kuhn, the medications Dick was taking impair cognitive functioning. Additionally, Dick's narcotics dosage "was at an all-time high" when he executed the 2008 Estate Plan. Dr. Kuhn also explained how prescribing high doses of narcotics following a period of low doses would result in further cognitive deficiency. According to Rich and Sesamie's proof, this is exactly what happened with Dick-Dick's dosage of narcotic pain medication from 2002 to 2007 was below average, then spiked to an extremely high dosage in 2008, October 2008 being the time of Dick's execution of the 2008 Estate Plan.

         A September 2008 hospital visit, in which Dick was diagnosed with an "overdose," led Rich to institute guardianship proceedings in district court. Rich sought to prevent Sue from administering Dick's medications and to place all financial matters in the hands of a qualified third party. The parties eventually reached an agreement whereby only the nurses would administer Dick's medications and a third-party CPA or bookkeeper would handle the income from the trust. But Rich testified that Sue refused to comply with this agreement-she continued to administer Dick's medications, and no CPA or bookkeeper was ever retained. Testimony from two of Dick's nurses revealed that one nurse allowed Sue to have extra medication for Dick at some point and the other nurse told Sue where to find the key to Dick's narcotic medications.

         Against all this evidence, Sue presented several medical experts, including many of Dick's own treating physicians. Sue's experts agreed that Dick had the cognitive ability to execute a valid will. The jury also heard testimony from Carolyn Carroway, the attorney overseeing Dick's 2008 Estate Plan execution, the will's attesting witnesses, and various other friends, family members, and even strangers who all believed Dick had the cognitive ability to execute a will.

          Sue points to the conclusions made in the district court guardianship proceedings that purportedly support her position that Dick had testamentary capacity to execute his 2008 Estate Plan. Specifically, on October 24, 2008, a report by a three-person interdisciplinary team appointed by the district court found Dick "not cognitively impaired and [to be] capable of expressing his wishes regarding his personal finances." Finally, Sue notes statements made by Rich himself in stipulating to the fact that Dick was "found not to be disabled, partially disabled, or incompetent" during the district court proceeding in which Rich sought to be named Dick's guardian, in addition to Rich's testimony admitting that his father was mentally competent during October of 2008, but that he was overmedicated.

         Sue also attacked the legitimacy of Rich and Sesamie's experts, Dr. Kuhn, who was not a licensed physician but rather a pharmacist, and Dr. Raffle, who never treated Dick.

         Finally, Sue directs us to view the video recording of Dick's signing of his 2008 will. The video appears to show Dick to be coherent and sound-of-mind.

         In sum, both sides presented evidence about Dick's mental capacity at the time of the execution of the 2008 Estate Plan-Rich and Sesamie presented evidence of Dick's weakened mental incapacity at that time while Sue presented evidence suggesting that Dick was completely mentally coherent. In dealing with this conflicting evidence, "we cannot. . . assume [the jury's] prerogative of weighing the evidence or passing on the credibility of the witnesses."[13] "[W]e cannot reverse a judgment merely because the evidence was admittedly conflicting."[14] As mentioned before, evidence of undue influence is relevant both in examining a jury's verdict on that issue and examining whether a testator had the testamentary capacity to execute "his own will . . . and not that of some one else."[15] So we must examine the "badges of undue influence" to determine if Sue unduly influenced Dick in the execution of the 2008 Estate Plan.

Two of the badges of undue influence seem to weigh immediately in Sue's favor. There is no evidence to suggest that Dick and Sue's 26-year marriage constituted "a recently developed and comparatively short period of close relationship."[16] And there is no evidence suggesting that Sue had "possession of the will . . . after it was reduced to writing."[17] That being said, the other badges weigh more in favor of Rich and Sesamie. No one can dispute that Dick was a "physically weak" testator at the time of the execution of his 2008 Estate Plan.[18] And as previously discussed, medical evidence presented by Rich and Sesamie suggests that Dick could have been a "mentally impaired testator" at that time, as well.[19]

          Whether the 2008 Estate Plan can be termed "unnatural" is a factor that does not come down squarely for either side.[20] On one hand, we find it unrealistic to consider "unnatural" a will that leaves everything to one's spouse of 26 years.[21] On the other hand, a will entirely disinheriting one's children under the particular facts of this case could be considered unnatural: "When a will disposes of the testator's property so that his children or other natural objects of his bounty are excluded or are favored unequally, the will is said to be 'unnatural' and that fact has an important bearing on the issue of undue influence."[22] It is undisputed that Rich and Yolanda, who were Dick's biological children and who had been included in Dick's estate plans for many years, were entirely excluded from the 2008 Estate Plan.

         Sue attempts to explain that exclusion by viewing the totality of the circumstances of the case. Sue points to the famously dramatic and volatile relationship between Dick and Rich and Yolanda that seemed to reach its apex when Dick made good on his threat of disinheriting them after they attempted to impose a guardianship over him. But this kind of conflicting evidence, once again, highlights the jury's role to decide whose story to believe.

         Sue also refers us to Dick's earlier wills, specifically, Dick's 1998, 2000, and 2002 wills, which, she argues, look more like Dick's 2008 Estate Plan than his 2004 Estate Plan.[23] The 1998, 2000, and 2002 wills grant a life estate in Dick and Sue's main residence to Sue and allow Sue most of the income generated from one of Dick's properties. But it is undeniable that the 2008 Estate Plan was the first estate plan executed by Dick that completely disinherited Rich and Sesamie-this fact alone calls into question the weight given to Sue's assertion that the three previous wills look more like the 2008 Estate Plan than the 2004 plan.

         Rich and Sesamie presented evidence suggesting "participation by the principal beneficiary in the preparation of the will," Sue.[24] Sue was not simply the principal beneficiary of the 2008 Estate Plan, she was its sole beneficiary. Rich and Sesamie presented evidence suggesting that Carolyn Carroway, the attorney purportedly hired to act on behalf of Dick to assist him in executing his 2008 Estate Plan, was really acting in a dual role because she was helping Sue. In other words, the inference asserted by Rich and Sue's evidence was that Carroway was Sue's instrument.[25]

         The record contains evidence from Rich and Sesamie tending to support their argument that Carroway acted as Sue's attorney just as much as she acted as Dick's attorney. Specifically, bills submitted by Carroway to Dick include charges for consultations with Sue and her attorney, C.V. Collins, on October 10 and 13 of 2008, November 12 and 14 of 2008, and February 2 of 2009. Additionally, on October 27, 2008, the day of the execution of the 2008 Estate Plan, Carroway noted, "Revisions to documents; review and execution of Revocation of Trusts, Will and deeds with client and Sue Getty." Finally, the record contains a letter written on behalf of Dick and Sue to a bank in which she refers to those two as "my clients."

         The video of the execution of Dick's 2008 will reveals that when it was time for the attesting witnesses to sign the will, Carroway explained that when the first of the witnesses was done signing Dick's will, she would have to switch with the other witness holding the camera "since it's just the four of us in this room," meaning Dick, Carroway, and the two witnesses. Yet the attesting witnesses testified at trial that Sue was present at least for a period during the will execution. Recall also that Sue had to have been present that day to sign the deeds that were also executed on that day making her a joint tenant with Dick of certain properties with a right of survivorship. The implication presented to the jury by Rich and Sesamie on this evidence was that Carroway, for whatever reason, stated that Sue was not present during the will signing when, in fact, she was.

         The jury heard additional evidence from Rich and Sesamie that suggested impropriety on the part of Carroway. On August 3, 2009, Dick executed an affidavit swearing that the execution of his 2008 Will was valid and that he had no desire to change the terms of that will. At trial, Carroway admitted that she prepared the affidavit of her own accord and without request or direction from Dick to do so. Additionally, Carroway admitted that, upon finding a mistake in one of the deeds that Dick signed over to Sue, Carroway altered the document without Dick's knowledge and filed it of record instead of correcting it and having Dick sign it again.

         Sue dismisses most of this evidence regarding Carroway as simply an attempt to disparage a reputable attorney and argues that the descriptions of Carroway's services provided in her bills are taken out of context. Sue also attempts to refute Rich and Sesamie's insinuation that Carroway was acting on Sue's behalf during Dick's estate plan execution by pointing to the fact that Carroway had never met the Gettys before October of 2008, having been referred to them by another attorney. Sue affirmatively points to the extensive notes taken by Carroway during her representation of Dick, coupled with her testimony about her services provided to him and their relationship, as explicit evidence refuting the idea that Carroway conspired with Sue to hand over Dick's entire estate to Sue.

         Rich and Sesamie attempted to create a narrative that Sue conspired with Carroway to dupe Dick, whom Sue was allegedly overmedicating, into handing over his entire estate to Sue; that Carroway allowed herself to be influenced by Sue; or, at the very least, that Carroway and Sue became close enough to call into question Carroway's allegiance to Dick in the execution of his 2008 Estate Plan. By pointing to specific evidence indicating a questionable relationship between Carroway and Sue and questionable activity on the part of Carroway in the preparation, execution, and post-execution of the 2008 Estate Plan, Rich and Sesamie promoted that narrative. It is not a reviewing court's prerogative to overturn a jury's verdict that is supported by evidence of record, even when one party's story may seem more plausible or acceptable to the reviewers than the other's.

         Finally, Rich and Sesamie point to certain provisions of the 2008 will itself to suggest Sue's involvement in the creation and execution of Dick's 2008 Estate Plan. The record shows that Dick made it known consistently in the past that he wanted to have his remains interred in Pennsylvania with those of his late wife, Carol. In fact, in the previous five wills executed by Dick, spanning between 1998 and 2004, this provision ...


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