United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division, London
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
K. CALDVEELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
White is an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in
Manchester, Kentucky. Proceeding without a lawyer, White
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 [R. 1], which is now before the Court on
initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. See
Alexander v. Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 Fed.Appx.
544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). For the reasons set forth below,
the Court will deny White's petition.
2017, a federal grand jury indicted White, charging him with
(1) possession with the intent to distribute marijuana; (2)
using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime; and (3) being a felon
in possession of a firearm. See United States v. Chad
White, No. 1:17-cr-251 at R. 1 (W.D. Mich. 2017). At the
time, White was incarcerated at the Van Buren County Jail in
western Michigan and, therefore, the United States filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. See
Id. at R. 3. A United States Magistrate Judge granted
that petition, and White was transported to the custody of
the United States Marshal for the Western District of
Michigan. See id.
federal criminal case moved forward and, eventually, he pled
guilty to using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during
and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. See Rs.
42, 43. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Michigan then sentenced White to 84 months in
prison. See R. 86. White appealed his case to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, but he
later voluntarily dismissed that appeal. See R. 106.
has now filed a § 2241 petition with this Court, and he
indicates that he is challenging the computation of his
sentence. [R. 1 at 1]. Although White's arguments are
difficult to follow, he appears to be asserting three
different claims. First, White implies that the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) has miscalculated his release date by failing
to grant him credit for the time he spent in custody between
November 3, 2017 and September 18, 2018. [See R. 1
at 5; R. 1-1 at 4]. Second, White suggests that the Western
District of Michigan's sentence runs afoul of §
5G1.3(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
[See R. 1 at 5; R. 1-1 at 4]. Third, White argues
that his trial attorney provided him with ineffective
assistance of counsel because the lawyer did not adequately
address what White calls “the jail credit
question” and “concurrency issue.” [R. 1-1
at 5]. Ultimately, White asks this Court to grant him
“a downward departure of [approx.] ten 10 months and
ten (10) days to be adjusted to said petitioner's current
federal sentence.” [R. 1 at 8].
Court has fully reviewed White's submission, but it will
deny his petition at this time. To be sure, a § 2241
petition is a vehicle for challenges to actions taken by
prison officials that affect the way the prisoner's
sentence is being carried out. See Terrell v. United
States, 564 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009). Thus,
White's first claim- which implies that the BOP has
miscalculated his release date-is one that he generally could
raise in a § 2241 petition. However, White makes it
clear that he has not yet taken steps to formally exhaust his
administrative remedies within the BOP. [R. 1-1 at 1-2].
While White claims that he “need not exhaust [his]
administrative remedies” because doing so would be
“frivolous” [R. 1-1 at 2], he has not adequately
explained why that would be the case, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly made it
clear that a prisoner must fully exhaust his remedies within
the BOP before he may seek habeas relief under § 2241.
See, e.g., Luedtke v. Berkebile, 704 F.3d 465, 466
(6th Cir. 2013); Fazzini v. Northeast Ohio Correctional
Center, 473 F.3d 229, 231-33 (6th Cir. 2006). This
exhaustion requirement ensures that the agency has an
opportunity to review its actions before litigation is
commenced. This preserves judicial resources as well as
administrative autonomy and ensures that a court reviewing
the agency's final action does so based upon a complete
record. See Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874,
881 (9th Cir. 2003); Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 761-62 (3d Cir. 1996). Since White
did not fully exhaust his administrative remedies within the
BOP, his habeas petition is premature.
White's second and third claims-that the Western District
of Michigan's sentence runs afoul of § 5G1.3(b) of
the sentencing guidelines and White's trial attorney
provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel-are
simply not proper in a § 2241 petition. Instead, these
claims are only appropriate on direct appeal and/or in a
motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See
Corral v. Barnhart, No. 6:18-cv-116-GFVT, 2018 WL
3615994, at *3 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (explaining that claims of
ordinary trial error must be pursued on direct appeal and/or
in a § 2255 motion).
it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. White's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to § 2241 [R. 1] is DENIED.
2. This action is STRICKEN from the