United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky
H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge.
Kerri Danielle Hodge filed the instant pro se 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma
pauperis. Plaintiff also filed a letter (DN 6), in which
she states that she has been informed that Defendant Stephen
Renfrow's name is actually Wayne Renfrow. The Court
construes the filing as a motion to amend the complaint. Upon
review, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to
amend the complaint (DN 6) is GRANTED.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Clerk of
Court is DIRECTED to change the name of Defendant
Stephen Renfrow to Wayne Renfrow in the docket sheet.
matter is before the Court on the initial review of the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Upon review,
the Court will dismiss the action for the reasons stated
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
a convicted inmate at the Daviess County Detention Center
(DCDC), sues Stephen Renfrow, a deputy at DCDC, in his
official capacity only, as well as DCDC itself.
states, “In Feb 2017 I was assaulted by Deputy
Renfrow.” She reports that another inmate “was
trying to fight me [and] all the deputies was crowded around
her. I was standing calmly alone out of nowhere Dep. Renfrow
comes and pushes me. I asked why you push me Im not the
aggressor. Later that night he came and tried to
apologize.” She asserts that she filed grievances and
was told that they were “in a blindspot[, ]”
which she disputes, and that nothing was done about it.
states, “Shortly after that I started having problems
with spine/back.” She asserts that she filled out
medical forms and was given Tylenol 3 and two mats. She
asserts that when she was released from DCDC she continued to
have “problems” and that she had an MRI and was
sent to a neurosurgeon on March 29, 2018. She states that she
had to have surgery on her spine due to her injury.
further states, “I'm still having problems. This
jail refuses to treat me. She just says I need better posture
and too tense. I told her at the other jail I was getting off
the floor and something pulled.” Plaintiff asserts,
“I feel like it is cruel and unusual punishment to even
be housed here b/c they are not treating me fairly because of
my voice on things. Even one deputy told me when I was like
they not going to let me work or do anything b/c they
don't like me she said nope.” Plaintiff continues,
“My right to be protected has been violated my right to
receive medical also. I've filed grievances on all this
even when Dep. Renfrow slammed the flap in my face. All they
said on this was the incident was investigated that you
claiming happened as if I made it up.” She alleges that
she did not receive responses to some grievances. She states,
“I feel as if my rights of life, pursuit of safety and
happiness, free speech, & redress of grievances also my
right no cruel & unusual punishment inflicted has all
been violated. I'm not treated fairly here b/c of my
voice on it.”
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). When determining
whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside,
Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from