United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington
ARTHUR A. RALSTON, Petitioner,
WARDEN QUINTANA, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
M. Hood Senior U.S. District Judge.
A. Ralston is an inmate at the Federal Medical Center in
Lexington, Kentucky. Proceeding without an attorney, Ralston
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. [R. 1]. This matter is now before the
Court on initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
See Alexander v. Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419
Fed.Appx. 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will deny Ralston's petition.
2015, while Ralston was detained in the Fulton County
Detention Center in Hickman, Kentucky, a federal grand jury
charged him with (1) conspiracy to possess with the intent to
distribute methamphetamine; (2) possession with the intent to
distribute methamphetamine; (3) purchasing, owning, or
possessing body armor after having been convicted of a
violent felony; and (4) being a felon in possession of a
firearm and ammunition. See United States v.
Ralston, No. 5:15-cr-020, at R. 1 (W.D. Ky. 2015).
Ralston was then placed in federal custody pursuant to a writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, see R. 16, and his
case moved forward.
Ralston pled guilty to the four charges against him. See
Id. at R. 42. Then, on April 13, 2016, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky sentenced
Ralston to a total of 120 months in prison. See R.
57. Shortly thereafter, Ralston was returned to the custody
of Kentucky state authorities, and the Western District of
Kentucky's Judgment was filed as a detainer. See
April 28, 2016, Ralston was sentenced in state court to a
term of imprisonment for “trafficking in a controlled
substance-first degree” and “promoting
contraband-first degree.” Id. Ralston then
began serving time in state custody and, on August 1, 2017,
his state obligation was satisfied. See Id.
Therefore, Ralston was transferred to federal custody
pursuant to the detainer, and he started serving his federal
now wants to receive credit against his federal sentence for
the time he spent in state custody between April 28, 2016 and
August 1, 2017. To date, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has not
credited this time against Ralston's federal sentence
and, thus, Ralston filed a § 2241 petition with this
Court complaining about the way the BOP calculated his
sentence. [R. 1].
petition, however, is unavailing because he has not
demonstrated that the BOP erred in calculating his sentence.
Here, the Western District of Kentucky's Judgment was
silent on whether Ralston's federal sentence was to run
concurrent with or consecutive to his anticipated state
sentence, see Ralston, No. 5:15-cr-020, at R. 57,
and the calculation of a federal prisoner's sentence is
determined by 18 U.S.C. § 3585. That statute provides:
(a) A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the
date the defendant is received in custody awaiting
transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service
of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the
sentence is to be served.
(b) A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a
term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official
detention prior to the date the sentence commences
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant
was arrested after the commission of the offense for which
the sentence was imposed; that has not been credited against
18 U.S.C. § 3585.
the Western District of Kentucky sentenced Ralston on April
13, 2016. However, pursuant to § 3585(a), the BOP
properly determined that Ralston's federal sentence did
not commence until August 1, 2017, the date that he was
received in federal custody. See Ralston, No.
5:15-cr-020, at R. 90. Moreover, Ralston did not receive
credit against his federal sentence for the time he spent in
state custody pursuant to § 3585(b) because
Ralston's time in state custody was “credited
against another sentence, ” his state sentence. Thus,
Ralston has not demonstrated in any clear way that the BOP
erred in calculating his sentence.
nevertheless suggests that the Western District of Kentucky
ran afoul of § 5G1.3(c) of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines when it imposed its sentence. That provision
provides that if “a state term of imprisonment is
anticipated to result from another offense that is relevant
conduct to the instant offense of conviction . . ., the
sentence for the instant offense ...