United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro
H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge United States District Court
Damien Arron Golike filed the instant pro se 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court on the initial
review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Upon review of the complaint, the Court will dismiss the
action for the reasons stated herein.
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
a pretrial detainee at the Hopkins County Jail, sues the
following Defendants: William Braden, a Kentucky state
trooper; Chris Evitts, a City of Clay police officer; and
Donald Jones, a Webster County deputy sheriff. He sues
Defendants in their individual and official capacities.
states, “My right to be free from assault was violated
by trooper William Braden, Chris Evitts, and Donald Jones on
or around April 26th 2017, by allowing me to be assaulted
while in the backseat of Deputy Sheriff Donald Jones' SUV
handcuffed.” He reports that he and another individual,
Alex Harvey, were both handcuffed in the backseat of separate
police vehicles. He states that Defendants Braden and Evitts
“left Mr. Harvey unattended in the police cruiser while
it was running with the security divider window open allowing
Mr. Harvey to get into the driver seat of the police
cruiser.” He continues, “Mr. Harvey was able to
use Chris Evitts police cruiser to ram Donald Jones' SUV
in which I was handcuffed in the backseat of.”
Plaintiff states that Defendant Jones did not place a
seatbelt on him “acting neglegently in his duty of
care.” He maintains, “As a result of the vehical
being rammed, my body was tossed toward the floorboard
causing injury to my neck, back, and shoulder.”
further asserts that his “right to adequet medical care
was also violated by denying me medical attention after the
incident in which a vehical was involved. I was taken to the
jail where I also requested to be seen by medical and was
told there was no nurse on shift.”
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). When determining
whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside,
Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Court construes the complaint as alleging claims under §
1983 for failure to protect in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and denial of medical treatment in violation of the
Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment,  as well as
state-law negligence claims. The incident occurred on April
26, 2017. Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of
limitations period, but it is well settled that
constitutional claims asserted under § 1983 are governed
by the state personal injury statute of limitations. Fox
v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985)).
Personal injury actions in Kentucky “shall be commenced
within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued.”
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1); Collard v. Ky. Bd. of
Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990). Although the
statute of limitations is an affirmative ...