United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
REBECCA GRADY JENNINGS, DISTRICT JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
Timothy Augustus Ward initiated this pro se 42
U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights action. Because some of
Plaintiff's claims were related to an ongoing state-court
criminal proceeding, in which Plaintiff had been charged with
disorderly conduct, menacing, and resisting arrest, the Court
entered an Order staying the action pending the resolution of
the state-court case. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384, 393-94 (2007) (“If a plaintiff files . . . any . .
. claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a
pending or anticipated criminal trial, it is within the
power of the district court, and in accord with common
practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or
the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.”).
Plaintiff has now filed a letter in which he indicates that
his “criminal case is over.” Thus, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the STAY in this action is LIFTED. The Court
will now screen Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
names the following as Defendants in this action - the
Kentucky State Police (KSP); KSP Commissioner Richard W.
Sanders; KSP Trooper Ken Borders, in both his official and
individual capacities; the City of Elizabethtown; John Does
1-15; Jane Does 1-15; Hardin County Detention Center (HCDC);
HCDC Jailer Danny Allen; and Hardin County Ambulance
Services. Plaintiff does not indicate in what capacity he
sues any Defendant other than Defendant Borders.
alleges that on May 29, 2016, Defendant Borders pulled
Plaintiff over for not allowing him to pass when he had his
squad car lights on. Plaintiff informed Defendant Borders
that this was an abuse of authority because he was not in
route to an emergency and he could have used the passing lane
to pass Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that Defendant Borders
then wrote him a citation for not having insurance on the
vehicle he was driving.
alleges that, after the incident, he contacted the KSP to log
a complaint against Defendant Borders. Defendant Borders'
supervisor allegedly told Plaintiff to meet him at the KSP
post in Hardin County. When Plaintiff arrived, Defendant
Borders and non-Defendant KSP Trooper Brown came out to speak
to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that he told them he wanted
to speak to their supervisor, but they refused. Plaintiff
states that he and the troopers then began to argue.
Plaintiff specifically states that as he began to leave,
Trooper Brown continued to yell at him and said
“I'll see you in ‘f-cking court' to which
Plaintiff replied “you f-cking p-ssy.” Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Borders then informed Plaintiff that
he was under arrest and told Plaintiff to put his hands
behind his back. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Borders
then began tasing him. Plaintiff alleges that he told
Defendant Borders that he had congestive heart failure and
that he could not put his hands up while tased, but that
Defendant Borders continued tasing him. Plaintiff states that
Defendant Borders then put handcuffs on him, grabbed him by
his hair, and sprayed “OC spray” in his eyes.
Plaintiff states that Defendant Borders told Plaintiff he was
arresting him for saying “you f-cking p-ssy.”
next alleges that the KSP called Hardin County Ambulance
Services to the scene. He states that the two emergency
medical technicians (EMT's) who arrived took his vitals
and told him that he had high blood pressure and high blood
sugar. According to Plaintiff, they told the KSP
officers that he needed to go to the hospital. Plaintiff
further alleges, however, that after the EMT's spoke with
the KSP officers, the EMT's refused to transport
Plaintiff to the hospital. Instead, Defendant Borders and
Trooper Brown transported Plaintiff to HCDC, where they
informed the nurse on duty that Plaintiff had elevated blood
pressure and blood sugar. Plaintiff states that he was booked
into HCDC at around 1:00 a.m. on May 30, 2016, and released
around 11:00 a.m. on the same day. He states that the HCDC
nurse checked his blood pressure and blood sugar twice during
that time and that although his readings remained high,
nurse refused his requests to be transported to the emergency
room. Plaintiff states that this refusal put him at risk of
having a stroke or heart attack.
Plaintiff states that after he was released from HCDC, he
went to the hospital where he was treated for several cuts on
his hand and his arm and given pain medication.
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court
must review this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). On
review, a district court must dismiss a case at any time if
it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
courts are to hold pro se pleadings “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this
duty to be less stringent “does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations, ” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a
claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975). To command otherwise would require courts “to
explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro
se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role
of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements
are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 ...