United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. Stivers, Chief Judge United States District Judge
matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss (DN 6, 7). The motions are ripe for adjudication. For
the following reasons, the motions are
actions alleged to have given rise to this case occurred
between November 2017 and January 2018. (Compl. ¶ 7, DN
1). Plaintiff Adam Upchurch (“Plaintiff”) alleges
he was disabled while employed as a teacher at Clinton County
Middle School, which is operated by Defendant Clinton County
Board of Education (“the Board”). (Compl.
¶¶ 16, 30). Plaintiff claims his coworkers referred
to a chair in which he sat during instructional time as
“the throne” and referred to Plaintiff's
special parking spot in some unspecified derogatory manner.
(Compl. ¶ 18). Plaintiff further alleges this conduct
was condoned by Clinton County High School Principal Stacey
Evans (“Evans”); Clinton County Middle School
Principal Angela Sloan (“Sloan”); and Board
Superintendent Charlotte Nasief (“Nasief”).
(Compl. ¶¶ 3-5, 18).
applied for numerous promotions and was allegedly passed over
as a result of his disability. (Compl. ¶ 19). Evans told
Plaintiff he was not being promoted because of his
disability, and certain unnamed Defendants allegedly said
Plaintiff was too sickly for promotion. (Compl. ¶¶
19-20). Plaintiff does not indicate what positions he applied
for, when he applied to them, who rejected him, or how he was
otherwise qualified for the positions. Plaintiff claims
Defendants denied him accommodations needed as a result of
his disability. (Compl. ¶ 21). Defendants also allegedly
forced Plaintiff to work in an increasingly hostile
environment, which ultimately resulted in his
resignation. (Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24).
asserts claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS Chapter 344; and the Kentucky
common law tort of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress (“IIED”). (Compl. ¶¶ 29-40).
Defendants has moved for dismissal of the claims asserted
against them pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
action arises under the laws of the United States and the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331. The Court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction
over Plaintiff's state law claims arising from the same
case or controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
survive dismissal for failure to state a claim under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citation omitted). A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. When considering a defendant's motion to
dismiss, the Court will “accept all the
[plaintiff's] factual allegations as true and construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the
[plaintiff].” Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2005). “A
pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s]
devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation
ADA & KCRA Claims
Complaint, Plaintiff purports to assert disability
discrimination claims under both the ADA and the KCRA.
(Compl. ¶¶ 13, 28-34). As the Sixth Circuit has
noted, “the language of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act
mirrors the language of  the Americans with Disabilities
Act . . . .” Brohm v. JH Props., Inc., 149
F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the analysis of
Plaintiff's ADA and KCRA claims are identical and will be
Complaint is bereft of nearly any facts to support a
disability discrimination claim. A person asserting such a
claim must show “that she or he is an individual with a
disability . . . .” Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d
585, 590 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff, however, states only
that he is an individual with a disability resulting from a
car accident in 2003. (Compl. ¶ 30). There is no factual
basis provided regarding Plaintiff's disabling condition,
how it affects him, whether the condition is stable or in
flux, what accommodations Plaintiff requires to work or
engage in ...