United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
WYATT FARMS GREENHOUSE/NURSERY, INC. JERRY WYATT MATT WYATT GINALEE WYATT PLAINTIFFS
FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION, MICHAEL STOKKE DEFENDANTS
B. Russell, Senior Judge United States District Court
matter is before the Court upon motion by Defendants, Farm
Credit Administration and Michael Stokke, to dismiss. (DN
13). On July 2, 2019, the Court granted in part
Plaintiffs' motion for extension of time. (DN 17).
Pursuant to the Court's order, Plaintiffs were permitted
to respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss by July 19,
2019. Id. Plaintiffs have chosen not to respond to
the motion, and the time to do so has passed. This matter is
ripe for review and for the following reasons,
Defendants' motion to dismiss (DN 13) is GRANTED.
filed their pro se complaint on July 31, 2018. (DN 1). In
their complaint, Plaintiffs allege federal question
jurisdiction. Id. The form-complaint filed by
Plaintiffs instructs them to “[l]ist the specific
federal statutes, federal treaties, and/or provisions of the
United States Constitution that are at issue in this
case.” Id. at 4. In the space provided under
this instruction, the Plaintiffs state “violated Borrow
Rights By Not enforcing its own Laws.” Id.
Under the “Statement of Claim” section of the
form-complaint, Plaintiffs state “FCA did not enforce
its own laws and protect rights of Borrow.”
Id. at 5. And under the “Relief” section
of the form-complaint, Plaintiffs state that they “seek
relief for lawyer fees, damage to credit, stress, loss of
family farm and others - 2m punitive damages of 10x.”
Id. at 6. The foregoing is the only content, other
than the names of the parties, included in Plaintiffs'
complaint. See id.
November 2, 2018, the Court held a telephonic conference and
found that Plaintiffs had not yet properly served the
Defendants. (See DN 7). Because the Plaintiffs are
pro se, the Court offered guidance on how to
properly effectuate service and provided Plaintiffs with
pertinent parts of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(i)
and 4(1). Id. The Court urged the Plaintiffs to
familiarize themselves with Rule 4 in its entirety and
granted the Plaintiffs until November 20, 2018 to properly
serve the Defendants. Id.
November 20, 2018, the Court held another telephonic
conference and found that Plaintiff had still not yet
properly served the Defendants. (See DN 9; DN 16 at
1). The Court again offered guidance on how to effectuate
service and granted Plaintiffs additional time to do so.
Plaintiff explained that he was attempting to hire an
attorney. The Court held another telephonic conference on
December 19, 2018 and again Plaintiffs informed the Court
that they were trying to find an attorney to take their case.
The Court allowed Plaintiffs additional time to effectuate
January 25, 2019, Plaintiff Jerry Wyatt advised the Court
that he was scheduled to meet with possible counsel. (DN 11).
The Court therefore extended the deadline for Plaintiff to
effectuate service. On February 15, 2019, the Court held a
telephonic conference that was attended by attorney John
David Cole who was reportedly considering representing the
Plaintiffs. (DN 12). On March 22, 2019, the Court held
another teleconference and learned that Mr. Cole would not be
representing the Plaintiffs. (DN 14). On July 2, 2019, the
Court instructed Plaintiffs that “THERE WILL BE NO MORE
EXTENSIONS OF TIME. After July 19, 2019, the Court will take
Defendants' motion to dismiss under consideration based
on the submissions that are on the record at that
time.” (DN 17). Plaintiffs have chosen not to respond
to Defendants' motion.
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]he
defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff has
failed to state a claim for relief.” Directv, Inc.
v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir.
1991)). A complaint must contain "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to survive a
motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), a party must
"plead enough factual matter to raise a
'plausible' inference of wrongdoing." 16630
Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d
868 (2009)). A claim becomes plausible "when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Should the
well-pleaded facts support no "more than the mere
possibility of misconduct," then dismissal is warranted.
Id. at 679. The Court may grant a motion to dismiss
"only if, after drawing all reasonable inferences from
the allegations in the complaint in favor of the plaintiff,
the complaint still fails to allege a plausible theory of
relief." Garceau v. City of Flint, 572
Fed.Appx. 369, 371 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 677-79).
have not responded to Defendants' motion to dismiss and
the time to do so has passed. The Court has granted
Plaintiffs additional time to respond on multiple occasions.
Pursuant to Joint Local Rule of Civil Practice 7.1(c),
“[f]ailure to rimely respond to a motion may be grounds
for granting the motion.” See also Humphrey v. U.S.
Attorney General's Office, 279 Fed.Appx. 328, 331
(6th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that a party's lack of
response to a motion or argument therein is grounds for the
district court's grant of an unopposed motion to dismiss
and noting that “if a plaintiff fails to respond or to
otherwise oppose a defendant's motion, then the district
court may deem the plaintiff to have waived opposition to the
motion”); Paulmann v. Hodgdon Powder Co.,
Inc., No. 3:13-CV-0021-CRS-DW, 2014 WL 4102354, *1-2
(W.D. Ky. Aug. 18, 2014) (holding that plaintiffs failure to
respond or otherwise oppose defendant's motion to dismiss
established that the plaintiff had waived opposition to the
motion). Because Plaintiffs have failed to oppose
Defendants' motion to dismiss, they waive opposition to
the Court will consider whether Plaintiffs have satisfied the
federal pleading standard. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court
explained that although “the pleading standard Rule 8
announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 556
U.S. at 678. Therefore, it is necessary for a complaint to
contain facts that support a plausible claim for relief.
Plaintiffs' complaint does not contain any such facts.
Under “Statement of Claim, ” Plaintiffs only
assert “FCA Did Not enforce its own Laws And Protect
rights of borrow.” (DN 1 at 5). This sentence does not
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and therefore
Defendants' motion to dismiss (DN 13) is GRANTED.
foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss (DN 13)
is GRANTED. The Court will enter a separate Order and