United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington
OPINION AND ORDER
K. CALDWELL, CHIEF JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on the defendant Abdul Hadi's
motion (DE 44) to revoke the magistrate judge's detention
charged with one count of conspiring to kidnap certain
individuals for ransom in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1201(c) and one count of conspiring to use interstate
facilities in the commission of a murder for hire in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958.
government moved that he be detained pending trial. Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1), a defendant must be detained
pending trial if, after a hearing, a judicial officer finds
that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure his appearance at future court proceedings
and the public safety.
magistrate judge conducted a detention hearing and determined
that the government had proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that there are no conditions or combination of
conditions that would assure Hadi's appearance at future
court proceedings. (DE 16, Detention Order.) The magistrate
judge also concluded that the government has presented clear
and convincing evidence that Hadi poses a danger to another
person or to the community. Accordingly, the magistrate judge
ordered that Hadi be detained pending trial. Hadi then filed
this motion, asking the Court to revoke the magistrate
judge's detention order.
Court will conduct a de novo review of the
magistrate judge's detention order. The statute providing
for review of the magistrate judge's detention order does
not specifically require that the Court conduct an additional
hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). In his motion, Hadi does
not request a hearing, and he does not rely on or explain
evidence not already in the record that he would proffer at a
hearing in support of the motion to revoke the detention
order. Accordingly, a second detention hearing is not
necessary. See United States v. Gaviria, 828 F.2d
667, 670 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Jones,
No. 12:CR-105, 2012 WL 6737784, at * 1, n.1 (D. Conn. 2012);
United States v. Burks, 141 F.Supp.2d 1283, 1285 (D.
Kan. 2001);United States v. Alonso, 832 F.Supp. 503,
504 (D. Puerto Rico 1993); United States v. Bergner,
800 F.Supp. 659, 661 (N.D.Ind.1992).
resolving this motion, the Court will rely on the affidavits
filed in support of the criminal complaints in this matter,
the indictment, the Pretrial Services Report prepared by the
U.S. Probation Office, the transcript of the detention
hearing, and the pleadings submitted by the parties.
is appropriate if the government proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant is a flight risk or if it
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
poses a danger to the public or any person. United States
v. Hinton, 113 Fed.Appx. 76, 77 (6th Cir. 2004).
making this determination, the court is to consider
“the available information” on the following
factors: the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
including whether the offense is a crime of violence; the
weight of the evidence against the person; the history and
characteristics of the person; and the nature and seriousness
of the danger to any person or the community posed by the
person's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
the nature and circumstances of the offenses at issue here,
conspiracy to commit murder for hire and to kidnap are both
serious charges. The murder-for-hire charge carries a
possible prison term of 10 years; the kidnapping charge
carries a maximum life sentence. Further, both are
“crimes of violence.” The Bail Reform Act defines
a crime of violence as “an offense that has as an
element of the offense the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of
another, ” or “any other offense that is a felony
and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the offense.” 18
U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(A), (B). Thus, this factor weights
in favor of detention.
the weight of the evidence against Hadi, the Court must weigh
the evidence regarding the danger Hadi poses to the public or
any person, not the evidence of his guilt. United States
v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 948 (6th Cir. 2010). Likewise,
where the flight risk is under consideration, the weight of
the evidence goes to the evidence of the flight risk.
United States v. Xiaorong You, No. 2:19-CR-14, 2019
WL 2426659, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. June 10, 2019). In weighing the
evidence on these issues, the Court will consider Hadi's
personal history and characteristics and the nature and
seriousness of any danger to any person or the community
posed by his release.
regarding any danger posed by Hadi is derived largely from
the affidavits submitted by FBI Special Agent Andre Mugnier
and Detective William J. Jackson, which were filed in support
of the criminal complaints, and by the testimony of Detective
Jackson at the detention hearing. In his affidavit, Jackson
identifies himself as a deputy U.S. Marshal with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and as a detective with the
University of Kentucky Police Department. At the detention
hearing, Detective Jackson explained that he has been
assigned to an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. (DE 20, Tr. at
Mugnier and Jackson affidavits and Detective Jackson's
testimony at the detention hearing recount the contents of
three recorded conversations between co-defendant Mahmoud
Shalash and a confidential source.
first recording was of a meeting that occurred on March 12,
2019 at the Days Motel in Lexington between Shalash and the
source. Detective Jackson testified that Shalash owns the
Days Motel and that Shalash ...