United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green
JEFFREY ALLEN JONES, SR. PLAINTIFF
KSP OFFICER FORBIS et al. DEFENDANTS
N. Stivers, Chief Judge.
Jeffrey Allen Jones, Sr., filed the instant pro se
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court on initial
review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
is a convicted inmate at the Luther Luckett Correctional
Complex (LLCC). He sues the following Defendants: Daniel
Forbis, identifying him as a Kentucky State Police Officer;
John Miller, a Commonwealth's Attorney; Shelby Miller, a
Commonwealth's Attorney; Judge Todd Spaulding, a District
Judge in Taylor and Marion County, Kentucky; and Shanda West
Stiles, a “Defen[s]e Attorney.”
states, “The aledged crime happened at 840 Maple Road,
where me and my ex-wife Jorretta Thompson Jones pay taxes to
Marion County Ky. I was put in Taylor Co. Jail, where I was
also indicted in Taylor County, by a Taylor County Grand
Jury.” Plaintiff continues, “I kept on to my
court appointed attorney Shanda West Stiles to file a motion
for dismissal, but she just talked down to me in a
be-littling mannor. So I filed a motion with Judge
Spaulding's Court to have attorney removed from my case,
also I filed another motion to have my case dismissed.”
Plaintiff states, “Judge Spaulding refused to answer my
motion to remove Shanda West Stiles, and he never did address
my motion to dismiss. I also filed another motion he never
did address. Judge Spaulding & all of these attorneys
worked a really great act in Kangaroo Court Room
Act's.” Plaintiff concludes, “I am the one
suffering because of all this malicious abuse of power over
the unedgecated person I am when it comes to law.”
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and
to “fire all the attorneys at fault” and to
“ban them all from ever practicing law ever
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district
court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal
conclusions.'” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488
(quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58
F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). Although this Court
recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a
less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir.
1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent'
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up
unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610
F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
sues all Defendants in their official capacities.
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally
represent  another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.'”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)
(quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Defendants are
all state employees or officials. Claims brought against
state employees in their official capacities are deemed
claims against the Commonwealth of Kentucky. See Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. State officials sued in
their official capacities for monetary damages are not
“persons” subject to suit under § 1983.
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 (1989). Further, the Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar
to claims for monetary damages against state employees or
officers sued in their official capacities. Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. at 169. For these reasons,
Plaintiff's official-capacity claims for monetary damages
must be dismissed.
injunctive relief, Plaintiff requests that the Defendant
attorneys be fired and “ban[ned]” from practicing
law. However, the Court does not have the authority under
§ 1983 to order that any Defendant be fired. See,
e.g., Ross v. Reed, No. 1:13-cv-143, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 44697, at *5-6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2013) (finding
that the Court has no authority under § 1983 to direct
that disciplinary proceedings be initiated against a
defendant); Theriot v. Woods, No. 2:09-cv-199, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14253, at *10-11 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2010)
(finding that requesting injunctive relief in the form of
ordering the firing of defendants is “frivolous,
” “entirely improper, ” and “not
available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and that the
court “has no authority under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
. . . terminate the employment of [the defendants]”).
Moreover, the Court has no authority to disbar any attorney.
See, e.g., In re Baumgartner, 123 Fed.Appx.
200, 203 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that the state has
jurisdiction to disbar an attorney and that the state's
authority of disbarment cannot be upset by federal review).
Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against Defendants
for monetary and injunctive relief must be dismissed for
seeking monetary damages from a defendant immune from such