United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
WILLIAM J. DAUGHERTY, PLAINTIFF
KSP MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, et al., DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
B. Russell, Senior Judge
matter is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff William
Daugherty's “Motion to the Court.” [R. 87.]
Remaining defendants Dr. Shastine Tangilag and Correct Care
Solutions did not respond and the deadline to do so has
passed. Therefore, this matter is ripe for adjudication. For
the reasons stated herein, Daugherty's Motion to the
Court, [R. 87], is DENIED.
Daugherty's motion, he protests that the general handling
of his case was unfair. Although he does not ask for any sort
of remedy, he asserts that he was not given a fair amount of
time to respond to the defendants' motions and that his
case should not have been dismissed due to his failure to
exhaust the grievance procedure. [R. 87 at 1-2.] As the Court
has already dismissed this action in a previous order and
judgment, [R. 86], the Court interprets Daugherty's
motion as a Rule 59 Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment.
Sixth Circuit has consistently held that a Rule 59 motion
should not be used either to reargue a case on the merits or
to reargue issues already presented, see Whitehead v.
Bowen, 301 Fed.Appx. 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v.
Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998)), or otherwise
to “merely restyle or rehash the initial issues,
” White v. Hitachi, Ltd., 2008 WL 782565, at
*1 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2008) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “It is not the function of a motion
to reconsider arguments already considered and rejected by
the court.” Id. (citation omitted). As another
district court in this circuit put it: “Where a party
views the law in a light contrary to that of this Court, its
proper recourse is not by way of a motion for reconsideration
but appeal to the Sixth Circuit.” Hitachi Med. Sys.
Am., Inc. v. Branch, 2010 WL 2836788, at *1 (N.D. Ohio
July 20, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit instructs that a
motion for reconsideration should only be granted on four
grounds: “Under Rule 59, a court may alter or amend a
judgment based on: ‘(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly
discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling
law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.'”
Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th
Cir. 2005)). Furthermore, because there is an interest in the
finality of a decision, this Court and other district courts
have held that “[s]uch motions are extraordinary and
sparingly granted.” Marshall v. Johnson, 2007
WL 1175046, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 19, 2007) (citing
Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal,
Inc., 904 F.Supp. 644, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1995)); accord
Rottmund v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 813 F.Supp.
1104, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
Daugherty does not specify any of the four grounds listed
above, the Court finds the most applicable to be “a
need to prevent manifest injustice, ” as Daugherty
generally asserts that the action was handled unfairly.
First, Daugherty argues that he was not given a fair amount
of time to respond to the defendants' motions. [R. 87 at
1.] Specifically, he states: “Correct Care Solution[s]
delay[ed] the court for six months, and still the court
allow[ed] them time to respon[d], but they don't give me
any time to respon[d] to do anything before they dismiss the
rest of my claim . . . .” [Id.] Although
Daugherty claims he was not given a sufficient amount of time
to respond, he does not cite a specific instance in which
Daugherty filed timely responses to both the motion to
dismiss, [R. 40], and motion for summary judgment, [R. 64].
Daugherty also filed four sur-replies regarding the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. [R. 67, 72, 73,
& 76.] Therefore, the Court finds that Daugherty
was given a fair amount of time to respond to the motions
filed by the opposing parties.
Daugherty asserts that his case should not have been
dismissed due to his failure to exhaust the grievance
procedure. [R. 87 at 1.] He argues, “my whole claim was
[supposed] to be about a doctor not doing her job, not about
a grievance that was not file[d] . . . .”
[Id.] As the Court explained in its Memorandum
Opinion, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) bars a civil
rights action challenging prison conditions until the
prisoner exhausts “such administrative remedies as are
available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007)
(“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory
under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought
in court”). As the defendants provided evidence that
Daugherty failed to ever file a single grievance against Dr.
Tangilag or Correct Care Solutions, and Daugherty provided no
evidence showing otherwise, the PLRA clearly bars
Daugherty's action for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. [See R. 85 at 4-5.] Furthermore, the Court found
that even if Daugherty exhausted the available administrative
remedies, Daugherty's Fourteenth Amendment claim would
still fail on the merits. [See Id. at 6.] Thus, the
Court stands by its previous findings on this issue.
conclusion, the Court finds that its previous judgment need
not be altered in order to prevent manifest injustice. IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED: Daugherty's Motion to the Court, [R. 87],
 True, the Court subsequently warned
Daugherty that any further sur-replies would be stricken;
however, the four previous sur-replies were allowed to ...