United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro Division
H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge
matter is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff
Brian Minion's pro se complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the Court
will dismiss the instant action.
is a pretrial detainee currently incarcerated in the
Henderson County Detention Center. He brings suit pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 regarding his prior incarceration in
the Grayson County Detention Center (GCDC). As Defendants, he
names Dr. John Doe and Nurse John Doe, GCDC healthcare
providers, in their official capacities.
to the complaint, Plaintiff was housed at GCDC from June 29,
2017, until May 2018. He claims as follows:
I made a doctor appointment while I was at Marion County Jail
“C.C.A.” before I went to [GCDC] to get a STD
check up. I got ship to Grayson County on the day of my
appointment and I told the nurse's of my issue of lower
back problems and blood in my under wear three weeks of me
being there. they put me on antibiotic and said that I had a
bacteria infection. My issue occur the same way multiple time
same issue blood in my urine and lower back pain and they
perscribe me more antibiotic again. In May of 2018 I got sent
to Lexington Federal Prison. Dr Adams did blood work on me
and said I had a STD. then 6 weeks later I suffer Bell Palsy.
from a infection I had for a year. that the Doctor &
nurse's never cure me from, Dr. Adam at Lexington had to
give me 2, 000 mg of antibiotic to cure me and I never seen
blood in my urine or had lower back pain again. doctor at
[GCDC] never notice it was a issue of me having the same
medical issue of the same problem to go deeper to see why
I'm having the same infections thinking that I was having
sexual activity in the facility instead looking deeper into
the problem. medical issue.
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
courts are to hold pro se pleadings “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this
duty to be less stringent “does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations, ” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a
claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975). To command otherwise would require courts “to
explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro
se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role
of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
sues Defendants Dr. and Nurse John Does, whom he identifies
as working at GCDC, in their official capacities only.
“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally
represent  another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.'”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)
(quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Therefore, to
the extent Defendants are employees of GCDC, the