United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge
Jonny Alexander Reyes Martinez, filed a pro se,
in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. This matter is before the Court for screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set forth below, this action
will be dismissed in part and allowed to continue in part,
and Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend his
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
is a pretrial detainee at the Grayson County Detention Center
(GCDC). He names as Defendant GCDC Jailer Jason Woosley in
his individual and official capacities. He alleges that on
March 15 his right shoulder was injured when the corrections
officer driving the van in which he was riding “hit the
brake” because he almost collided with another car,
tossing Plaintiff to the front of the van. Plaintiff states
that, once back at GCDC, he requested medicine for his pain
from the medical unit. He states, “They put me on a
pill to ease my pain.” He states that after a few days
they “gave me a pill that harm me.” He explains
that the morning after taking the new pill “my entire
body started itching. The CO took me to medical and from
there I was taking to the hospital. At the hospital, the
doctor told me I was giv[en] a Tylenol and that the cause of
my symptoms.” He further states that he was released
from the hospital and taken back to GCDC but was rushed back
to the hospital because his symptoms worsened. He states
that, at the request of the doctor, he was transferred from
that hospital to a hospital in Louisville. He states that he
was told that on the way to the hospital he nearly suffered
cardiac arrest and that he was in a coma for two hours. He
further states that he remained in the hospital for six days.
alleges that GCDC was aware that he is allergic to Tylenol
“but yet gave me the pill because they didn't have
what I was normally tak[ing].” As relief, Plaintiff
requests monetary damages.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A
claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining
whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside,
Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a
reviewing court must liberally construe pro se
pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must
include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
complaint does not contain any allegations against Defendant
Woosley, the GCDC Jailer.
doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to
control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to
impute liability onto supervisors. Monell v. N.Y.C.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978);
Taylor v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 69 F.3d 76,
80-81 (6th Cir. 1995). Additionally, “simple awareness
of employees' misconduct does not lead to supervisor
liability.” Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888,
903 (6th Cir. 2003). “[P]roof of personal involvement
is required for a supervisor to incur personal
liability.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567,
575 (6th Cir. 2008). “[A] plaintiff must plead that
each Government-official defendant, through the
official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 676 (2009); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295,
300 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that supervisory liability
“must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and
cannot be based upon ‘a mere failure to
act'”) (quoting Salehpour v. Univ. of
Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)).
for a supervisor such as Defendant Woosley to be held liable
under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that Defendant
Woosley was personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct. Plaintiff does not do so, and,
therefore, fails to state a claim against Defendant Woosley
in his individual capacity.
suits . . . ‘generally represent [ ] another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is
an agent.'” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691
n.55). Thus, the official-capacity claim against Defendant
Woosley is in actuality brought against Grayson County.
§ 1983 claim is made against a municipality, in this
case Grayson County, a court must analyze two distinct
issues: (1) whether the plaintiff's harm was caused by a
constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the
municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins
v. City of Harker ...