United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
B. Russell, Senior Judge.
matter is before the Court upon Defendant Charles Aaron
Davis's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 68). Fully
briefed, this matter is ripe for adjudication. For the
reasons that follow, the Defendants' Motion to for
Summary Judgment, (R. 68), is HEREBY GRANTED.
se Plaintiff and inmate, Rodney Smith, alleges that on
April 18, 2017, prison officials at Kentucky State
Penitentiary (KSP) subjected him to an unlawful cavity search
after an iPod allegedly went missing from his cell. (R. 1).
On April 25,  2017, Smith was taken to see Nurse Charles
Aaron Davis in response to rectal pain allegedly resulting
therefrom. (Id.). Smith claims that Nurse Davis
“immediately began to question him” about who had
conducted the cavity search. According to Smith, Nurse Davis
was “more concerned of the incident and/or activity
than [Smith's] well-being and safety.”
(Id.). Finally, Smith alleges that Nurse Davis
prematurely terminated Smith's medical visit “out
of machination and to protect the integrity or lack thereof
Respondent Rodriguez [the KSP official who allegedly
performed the damaging cavity search].” (Id.).
12, 2017, Smith filed Grievance No. 17-05-113-G against Nurse
Davis for Nurse Davis's alleged refusal to treat Smith
after the illegal cavity search. (R. 68, Ex. 3). Pursuant to
Kentucky Corrections Policies and procedures (CPP) §
14.6(J)(1)(a)(2), Grievance No. 17-05-113-G was rejected as
untimely because it was filed more than five days after Nurse
Davis allegedly denied Smith treatment. (See Id.).
September 11, 2017, Smith sued, among other defendants, Nurse
Davis in Franklin County Circuit Court. (R. 1). Smith alleged
that Nurse Davis's failure to treat Smith after the
cavity search violated his Eight Amendment rights. (R. 1). On
October 9, 2017, the Defendants removed the case to this
Court. On March 14, 2018, this Court conducted its initial
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 A, and allowed
Smith's Eighth Amendment claim against Davis to proceed.
Nurse Davis now moves for Summary Judgment. (R. 68).
judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether summary judgment
is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw
all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
every issue of fact or conflicting inference presents a
genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J. C.
Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1477 (6th Cir. 1989).
The test is whether the party bearing the burden of proof has
presented a jury question as to each element in the case.
Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 1996).
The plaintiff must present more than a mere scintilla of
evidence in support of his position; the plaintiff must
present evidence on which the trier of fact could reasonably
find for the plaintiff. See Id. (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct.
2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The plaintiff may accomplish
this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the
record” or by “showing that the materials cited
do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute . . .
.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Mere speculation will not
suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment; “the
mere existence of a colorable factual dispute will not defeat
a properly supported motion for summary judgment. A genuine
dispute between the parties on an issue of material fact must
exist to render summary judgment inappropriate.”
Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173,
1177 (6th Cir. 1996).
Davis argues that he is entitled to summary judgment for two
reasons: First, Smith failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies pursuant to the PLRA, and KSP Policy, and second,
Smith failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to
establish an Eighth Amendment claim against Nurse Davis. The
Court will address each argument in turn.
Smith's Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Davis argues that Smith failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies because Grievance No. 17-05-113-G, the only
grievance produced by either Party concerning Nurse Davis,
was rejected by grievance coordinator Danial Smith as
untimely. (See R. 68, Ex. 3). Defendant Smith does
not dispute that Grievance No. 17-05-113-G is the only
grievance that he filed against Nurse Davis. Nor in the 210
pages that Smith attached to his Response did he include any
grievance concerning Nurse Davis, other than Grievance No.
17-05-113-G. (See R. 73, Ex. 1-7). Smith also does
not dispute that Grievance No. 17-05-113-G was rejected
pursuant CPP § 14.6(J)(1)(a)(2) as untimely.
Smith responds that “several of [his] grievances
weren't allowed the privilege of complete exhaustion due
to machination, manipulation, and/or thwart, ” and that
“Danial Smith rejected several submitted grievance[s]
with no just cause.” Thus, the only issue before the
Court is whether Smith's failure to exhaust should be