United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Owensboro Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge.
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment [DN 34], Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment [DN 40], and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [DN 42]. Fully
briefed, these matters are ripe for decision. For the
following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED, Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Stanley Canary, is a former inmate at Daviess County
Detention Center (“DCDC”). He asserts that on
July 23, 2018, the Defendant, Nurse Mandy Ard, denied him
adequate medical care after he slipped while working and
injured his right shoulder and elbow. [DN 1 at 4]. He claims
that both directly after his fall-around 4:00 am that day-and
later that evening, he proceeded to the medical unit of the
jail seeking medical care and that both times, Nurse Ard
directed him to leave. [Id.]. Mr. Canary explains
that after he was turned away, he filed a grievance-Grievance
#298822-about his failure to receive necessary medical care.
[Id. at 5, DN 40-4]. DCDC later closed Mr.
Canary's grievance as unfounded. [DN 40-4].
Canary filed this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against
Nurse Ard on August 21, 2018, less than a month after the
incident at issue, alleging that Nurse Ard violated his
Eighth Amendment rights. At the time of filing, Mr. Canary
asserted he was in continual pain from the lack of treatment
to his right arm. After discovery, both parties filed motions
for summary judgment. [DN 34, DN 40].
Standard of Review and Law
the Court may grant a motion for summary judgment, it must
find that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the
initial burden of specifying the basis for its motion and
identifying the portion of the record that demonstrates the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the
moving party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party
thereafter must produce specific facts demonstrating a
genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
the Court must review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must
do more than merely show that there is some
“metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure require the non-moving party to
present specific facts showing that a genuine factual issue
exists by “citing to particular parts of materials in
the record” or by “showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine
dispute[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
[non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
Court addresses first Mr. Canary's Motion to Strike Nurse
Ard's Motion for Summary Judgment and then the motions
for summary judgment.
Motion to Strike
Canary filed two documents after Nurse Ard submitted her
Motion for Summary Judgment-a Motion Response to
Defendant's Request to Strike Plaintiff's Summary
Judgment [DN 41] and a Motion to Strike Mandy Ard's
Motion for Summary Judgment [DN 42]. In the latter filing,
Mr. Canary asks the Court to “strike Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment and grant summary judgment”
in his favor. [Id. at 5]. Nurse Ard responds that
Mr. Canary's request to strike her Motion is premised
merely on his disagreement with the facts she presented and
that such a basis is insufficient to strike her motion. [DN
43 at 1-2].
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) allows a court to “strike
from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). “Motions to strike under Rule 12(f)
are addressed within the sound discretion of the Court,
although they are generally disfavored.” Hashemian
v. Louisville Reg'l Airport Auth., No. 3:09-CV-951,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59962, 2013 WL 1788473, at *5 (W.D. Ky.
Apr. 26, 2013) (citing Ameriwood Indus. Intern. Corp. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 961 F.Supp. 1078, 1083 (W.D.
Mich. 1997) (internal citations omitted)). “Striking a
pleading is a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when
required for the purposes of justice.” Id.
(citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)).
Court can discern no merit in Mr. Canary's argument to
strike Nurse Ard's Motion for Summary Judgment. Her
Motion is well-supported by medical records, jail records,
and affidavits. Because the arguments contained therein also
relate to Mr. Canary's opposition to Nurse Ard's
Motion for ...