United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
B. RUSSELL, SENIOR JUDGE
a pro se civil rights action brought by a convicted
prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has
granted Plaintiff Christopher Bartley leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court for
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons
set forth below, the Court will dismiss some claims but allow
others to proceed.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
is a convicted prisoner incarcerated at the Christian County
Jail (CCJ). He names the following as Defendants in this
action - the Jenny Stewart Medical Center; Dr. Michael Wong;
CCJ Deputy Jailer Newby; and Advanced Correctional Healthcare
(ACH) Dr. Matthew Johnson.
Plaintiff makes the following allegations:
On November 9, 2018, I was taken by ambulance to Jenny
Stewart Medical Center . . . due to an accident received
while on work release from the [CCJ] . . . . After Dr. Wong
did my cat scan and x rays he proceeded to discuss a medical
issue that has nothing to do with the accident to Deputy
Jailer Newby. I believe my rights were violated when the Dr.
discussed my medical information and showed my x-ray/cat scan
results to a prison guard who has no medical training or need
to know (HIPPA ACT).
When I was released from the hospital on 11/9/18 and returned
to the jail they were upset about the incident and Dr.
Matthew Johnson (ACH) retaliated by locking me down and
making me sleep on the floor which lasted around  days in
general population. I believe Dr. Johnson violated my rights
by having me sleep on the floor where this was a medical
issue I should have been provided a bottom bunk furthermore
as a state inmate the county has an obligation to keep a
state prisoner 6” off the ground in a medical cell and
not in general population.
While doing pill call Dep. Jailer Newby came to the window
and called me by my last name to get my meds. When I did not
respond fast enough, because I was in pain and on the floor,
he said “Let's go Old Rib Neck” which that
comment stems from what Dr. Wong showed Dep. Newby on my cat
scan/x-ray results. After Dep. Newby made that comment I was
shamed each morning when the inmates would call me dick neck,
rib neck, get your pills. Deputy Newby violated my rights
when he made comments about my medical issues in front of a
roomful of inmates.
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages.
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the Court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 544
U.S. 199 (2007). In order to survive dismissal for failure to
state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “[A] pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)). However, while liberal, this standard of review does
require more than the bare assertion of legal conclusions.
See Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum,
58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995). The Court's duty
“does not require [it] to conjure up unpled
allegations, ” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a claim for a plaintiff.
Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise
would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would
also transform the district court from its legitimate
advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out
the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a
party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d
1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Defendant Dr. ...