United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. Hale, Judge.
Donovan John Bowshier filed the instant pro se 28
U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court on initial
review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Upon review, the Court will dismiss some of Plaintiff's
claims and allow one claim to proceed for further
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
is a convicted inmate at the Hardin County Detention Center
(HCDC). Plaintiff sues HCDC personnel Mike Gunter and Robert
Reynolds in their individual and official capacities.
asserts that on March 13, 2018, Defendant Gunter entered his
pod “almost immediately after dealing with an
altercation that involved physical contact.” According
to the complaint, Defendant Gunter “stormed into pod
disgruntled, mad, and many more aggravating feelings.”
Plaintiff states that he advised Defendant Gunter that
another inmate was lying. He maintains that Defendant Gunter
responded by telling him to “Shut up.” Plaintiff
states that Defendant Gunter had told the other inmate to
“roll” his belongings up and said to Plaintiff,
“‘Matter of fact' roll your things up too.
Your going to the hole.” Plaintiff asserts that he went
to his bunk area and began to roll up his things. Plaintiff
states, “As I turn around Deputy Mike Gunter has his
taser pulled out pointed at me and tells me to get on the
ground, I follow order and as I'm going down Deputy Mike
Gunter deploys his taser into my back. Tasing me calling for
back up.” Plaintiff continues, “Next thing I
k[no]w, Operations officer at the time is helping lift me up
off ground. I asked her why he did that and she did not
answer. I was taken to medical to have prongs pulled out and
then thrown in the drunk tank and then to hole.”
maintains, “It is my understanding that a person, an
inmate must be in a threatening manner to deploy taser. I was
pretty much on ground when deputy Gunter tased me in my back.
Camera footage and also numerous inmates would testify to the
wrong doing.” He states that another deputy reviewed
the video footage and “stated I was on the ground
pretty much when he tased me in the back.” Plaintiff
asserts that he discussed this with Defendant Reynolds who
“just brushed if off and told me I was in wrong. Lied
to me saying there was three deputies in pod when in fact
there was just Deputy Gunter.”
states that there are a “few deputies” at HCDC
“that walk around quick to pull out there tasers to
threaten inmates when its absolutely uncalled for.
Unnecessary when many times it is just an inmate trying to
talk but due to the deputies being perhaps unstable,
unprofessional, it is wrong.” Plaintiff also lists the
names of five people whom he identifies as witnesses.
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). When determining
whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside,
Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
sues Defendants in both their official and individual
capacities. “Official-capacity suits . . .
‘generally represent  another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.'” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Suing
employees in their official capacities is the equivalent of
suing their employer. Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d
433, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2008); Matthews v. Jones, 35
F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994); Smallwood v. Jefferson
Cty. Gov't, 743 F.Supp. ...