United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BOOM DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff
Telly Eugene Redd's pro se complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the
Court will allow a Fourteenth Amendment claim to proceed
against Defendant Mark Bolton in his individual capacity and
provide Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
is a pretrial detainee at the Louisville Metro Department of
Corrections (LMDC). He brings suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against LMDC Director Mark Bolton in his
individual and official capacities.
complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied mental health
medication during his incarceration at LMDC from July 8,
2018, until February 11, 2019. He indicates that prior to his
incarceration, he was on medication for diagnoses of
“severe depression, bipolar, impulsive control
disorder, anxiety, PTS and institutionalization.” He
claims that, upon his arrival at the jail on July 8, 2018, he
“made nursing and mental health aware that [he] took
medication for these psychiatric diseases.” He further
claims that he was asked to sign “release of info.
forms” throughout the duration of his incarceration at
LMDC “to get [his] meds. and getting them never
alleges that on July 22, 2018, he attempted suicide by
hanging and was taken to the hospital for x-rays. He
continues that upon return to the jail, he was “placed
on level 1, ” and “for 20 days I was kept in
suicide prevention before I seen a psych doctor.” He
claims that while visiting with the doctor, “LMDC
officers and Mental Health Staff told the doctor I was
manipulating housing. This caused Well Path Psychiatric
doctor to neglect me of any meds and mental health
services.” Plaintiff alleges, “Each time I became
fed up with life and tried to get help I was stripped of all
personal property and belongs, placed on suicide prevention.
I would also ask . . . about my meds only to be told
‘sign this release form and we'll get
them'” but “getting them never happen.”
claims that he spoke with Defendant Bolton about this issue
and that Defendant Bolton “stated the he would look
into it quite a few times only to have him ultimately tell
me, ‘I'm not going against my staff even if you are
in the right.'” He asserts that Defendant Bolton
was made aware of his situation “numerous times but
failed to correct or direct Well Path to assist and treat
me.” He alleges that the denial of “help and
medication” constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary and punitive damages and
“relief of current legal matters and treatment
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review
the instant action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under §
1915A, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss
the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the court
determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007).
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A]
district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as alleging a
Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need against Defendant Bolton. As indicated
above, Plaintiff sued Defendant Bolton in his individual and
suits . . . ‘generally represent  another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is
an agent.'” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55
(1978)). Thus, the official-capacity claim against Defendant