United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
VENCENTE B. HELM, Plaintiff,
NURSE MOON et al., Defendants.
J. HALE, JUDGE.
a pro se civil rights action brought by a prisoner
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted
Plaintiff Vencente B. Helm leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court for screening
of Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss this action.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
is incarcerated at the Louisville Metro Department of
Corrections (LMDC). He does not clearly indicate whether he
is a convicted prisoner or a pretrial detainee. He brings
this action against Wellpath, which is presumably the private
entity contracted by LMDC to provide medical services to
inmates; Nurse Moon of Wellpath; LMDC; LMDC Director Mark
Bolton; and LMDC Officer Johnson. Plaintiff indicates that he
is suing all Defendants in both their official and individual
alleges as follows:
My constitutional rights, HIPPA rights, and malpractice came
into play was violated when due to Nurse “Moon”
not paying attention to her duties as a medical nurse when
she was having a personal conversation with [Defendant]
Johnson while she was ministering (giving) out medicine at
med-call that may have been potentially harmful and
dangerous, that were not the medicine ordered, prescribe for
me and were in fact, “Someone else's
medicine”! Nurse Moon failed to provide me safe,
proper, and adequate medical care when she negligently
administered me the wrong medicine on pill call on 3-7-19,
evening meds/bedtime meds. Due to the action of the medical
nurse “Moon” not properly administering my
medication because of her personal conversation with
[Defendant] Johnson and distracted and not paying attention
at time of pill call has caused me to become more paranoid
and off my meds not about receiving medication that I need to
help my with my current illnesses. Paranoia-etc.
When I addressed Nurse Moon mistake after she received it she
furthered caused “Battery” Assault when she
stated “I was complaining like a woman” which is
defamation of my character and was abusive and hateful in
nature . . . .
I know longer take my medication because I don't trust
them. She violated HIPPA-malpractice etc . . . fundamental
As relief for these alleged wrongs, Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).