Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Helm v. Moon

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division

May 29, 2019

VENCENTE B. HELM, Plaintiff,
NURSE MOON et al., Defendants.


          DAVID J. HALE, JUDGE.

         This is a pro se civil rights action brought by a prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff Vencente B. Helm leave to proceed in forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court for screening of Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss this action.


         Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC). He does not clearly indicate whether he is a convicted prisoner or a pretrial detainee. He brings this action against Wellpath, which is presumably the private entity contracted by LMDC to provide medical services to inmates; Nurse Moon of Wellpath; LMDC; LMDC Director Mark Bolton; and LMDC Officer Johnson. Plaintiff indicates that he is suing all Defendants in both their official and individual capacities.

         Plaintiff alleges as follows:

My constitutional rights, HIPPA rights, and malpractice came into play was violated when due to Nurse “Moon” not paying attention to her duties as a medical nurse when she was having a personal conversation with [Defendant] Johnson while she was ministering (giving) out medicine at med-call that may have been potentially harmful and dangerous, that were not the medicine ordered, prescribe for me and were in fact, “Someone else's medicine”! Nurse Moon failed to provide me safe, proper, and adequate medical care when she negligently administered me the wrong medicine on pill call on 3-7-19, evening meds/bedtime meds. Due to the action of the medical nurse “Moon” not properly administering my medication because of her personal conversation with [Defendant] Johnson and distracted and not paying attention at time of pill call has caused me to become more paranoid and off my meds not about receiving medication that I need to help my with my current illnesses. Paranoia-etc.
When I addressed Nurse Moon mistake after she received it she furthered caused “Battery” Assault when she stated “I was complaining like a woman” which is defamation of my character and was abusive and hateful in nature . . . .
I know longer take my medication because I don't trust them. She violated HIPPA-malpractice etc . . . fundamental constitutional rights.
As relief for these alleged wrongs, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.


         When a prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

         In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a ‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'” Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

         Although this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the Court “to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

         III. ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.