United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Northern Division, Covington
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
L. BUNNING UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Brewer is an inmate confined at the Calhoun Correctional
Institution in Blountstown, Florida. Brewer has filed a
pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (Doc. # 3). This matter is before the Court to
conduct the initial screening required by 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
complaint, Brewer alleges that in February 2010 he was
arrested at his home in Grant County, Kentucky based upon a
warrant issued by the Miami-Dade County Sheriff's Office
in Florida for burglary, assault or battery, and kidnapping
with a weapon. He was held in custody for more than three
months, but was released when Florida officials failed to
take him into their custody. He was then re-arrested two days
later based upon the same warrant and also held on a contempt
charge in Kentucky for failure to pay child support. In June
2010 while being held at the Campbell County Detention Center
in Newport, Kentucky, Brewer wrote several letters to Major
Nagel requesting that he be taken before a judge so that an
attorney could be appointed to represent him and a hearing
held on the extradition request. Brewer indicates that no
such hearing was held, and on June 14, 2010, he was taken
into custody by Florida police and flown to Miami, Florida to
face the charges pending in that state.
states that in 2012 he received a copy of Florida's
extradition request and that the document states that a
criminal information was filed in Florida in August 2010- two
months after he was extradited, not before. Believing that
this rendered the extradition request defective, in July 2013
Brewer filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Circuit Court of Miami-Dade County in Florida contending that
his rights during the extradition process were violated. That
petition was denied in August 2013, as was his appeal from
that denial in September 2013. (Doc. # 3 at 14-15).
complaint in this case, Brewer contends that in June 2010
Major Nagel and Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway failed
to give him an opportunity to challenge his extradition to
Florida by appointing counsel to represent him and holding a
hearing. Brewer further contends that in May 2010 Florida
Attorney General Pamela Jo Bondi provided false information
in the extradition application by indicating that he had
already been charged, when in fact the criminal information
against him was not filed until after he was transferred to
Florida custody. Finally, Brewer indicates that in 2013 he
provided this information to Timothy Ryan, his jailer in
Florida, who took no action. Brewer alleges that the failure
to afford a hearing before extradition violated his right to
due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. For relief, Brewer
does not seek damages but asks this Court to grant his
“petition” so that he can be afforded a hearing
to establish that his rights were violated. (Doc. # 3 at 9,
thoroughly reviewed the complaint and the materials filed in
support of it, the Court concludes that it must be dismissed.
As a threshold matter, the complaint seeks relief properly
sought only through a habeas corpus petition, not a civil
rights complaint. Cf. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S.
282 (1978) (deciding challenge to validity of governor's
extradition warrant under Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
sought through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
Where, as here, a prisoner does not seek damages but instead
only a determination that would, if true, entitle him to
release from custody (either immediately or sooner than
called for by his criminal judgment) that relief must be
sought in a habeas corpus proceeding. Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (holding that habeas is
the exclusive remedy for a prisoner who seeks
“immediate or speedier release” from
confinement); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
489 (1973). That was the first avenue Brewer used to seek
relief in 2013; having failed in that endeavor, he may not
now attempt to seek relief in a different court by asserting
civil rights claims.
is also required because an alleged violation of extradition
procedures cannot form the basis for an action under Section
Although a number of courts allow a § 1983 claim when
officers fail to comply with extradition procedures
established by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
(“UCEA”), we believe that the constitutional and
statutory extradition provisions are not designed to protect
fugitives. Rather, they are designed to facilitate the
administration of justice between states. . . . While we do
not condone officials who fail to comply with extradition
procedures, a fugitive's rights are sufficiently
protected by those limitations placed on the demanding state
by the Constitution when determining his guilt or innocence.
And the Constitution “is satisfied when one present in
court is convicted of crime after having been fairly apprised
of the charges against him and after a fair trial in
accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards.”
Allowing an additional layer of constitutional challenge
affords the fugitive little benefit, while placing an
unnecessary burden on the extradition process, something the
Supreme Court has stressed must not be done.
Barton v. Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1295, 1298-99 (6th
Cir 1997) (citations omitted). The Court further noted that
extradition statutes are designed to benefit the asylum
state, not the fugitive, and confer no rights upon the
latter. Id. at 1297. Courts have thus consistently
dismissed § 1983 claims based upon an asserted failure
to comply with extradition procedures. See Norward v.
Ficano, 234 F.3d 1269, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 31 2000)
(unpublished table decision); Martin v. Anderson,
No. 2:14-cv-200-TWP-DHL, 2015 WL 328372, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.
Jan. 26, 2015).
even if Brewer could have brought a § 1983 claim based
upon an asserted failure to follow extradition procedures,
the time to do so has long since passed. The Court may
dismiss a claim plainly barred by the applicable limitations
period upon initial screening. Franklin v. Fisher,
No. 16-6464, 2017 WL 4404624, at *2 (6th Cir. May 15, 2017);
Castillo v. Grogan, 52 Fed.Appx. 750, 751 (6th Cir.
2002) (“When a meritorious affirmative defense based
upon the applicable statute of limitations is obvious from
the face of the complaint, sua sponte dismissal of the
complaint as frivolous is appropriate.”). Brewer's
claims against Major Nagel and Attorney General Conway
accrued in June 2010 when he requested an extradition hearing
but was not afforded one before his transfer to Florida.
Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations for asserting
personal injuries applies to claims under Section 1983.
Hornback v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Co. Gov't.,
543 Fed.Appx. 499, 501 (6th Cir. 2013). Because Brewer waited
nearly nine years to file suit, those claims are time-barred.
As for his claims against the jailer and Attorney General in
Florida, those claims would have accrued no later than 2012,
when he states he received a copy of Florida's
extradition request. Florida's four-year statute of
limitations applies to Section 1983 claims arising in
Florida. Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th
Cir. 2003). Because Brewer waited seven years to file suit
after he received a copy of the extradition request in 2012,
the claims against the Florida defendants are also
time-barred, and must be dismissed. Dellis v. Corr. Corp.
of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED as follows:
Brewer's complaint (Doc. # 3) is dismissed with
matter is stricken from the Court's