United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge
Kenneth Lee Brown filed a pro se, in forma
pauperis complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This matter is before the Court for screening pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114
F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the reasons set
forth below, the action will be dismissed in part and allowed
to continue in part.
SUMMARY OF CLAIMS
is a prisoner at the Breckinridge County Detention Center
(BCDC). He names as Defendants BCDC Jailer Tara Shrewsberry
in her individual and official capacities and the BCDC.
Plaintiff first alleges that in September 2018, Defendant
Shrewsberry refused to give him a § 1983 packet and that
once he asked for one, he was “reprimanded by not being
able to participate in any programs this facility
offered.” He also states that his request for
“work detail” was denied even though he qualified
next alleges that on September 12, 2018, he was refused
access to the law library. He states that Major Troy Seelve
spoke to him and was very upset and told Plaintiff he would
no longer do anything to help him. He states further,
“Also being reprimanded for requesting a 1983.”
Plaintiff alleges that from July 7, 2018, he was watched in
the shower “on camera, the camera can see in the
shower[.] Inappropriate comment was made.” Plaintiff
next states that on October 7, 2018, BCDC was
“withholding mail being sent to me all because I
requested a § 1983 packet.”
Plaintiff alleges that on September 18, 2018, he was attacked
by a county inmate, which was caught on camera. He states
that, even though he tried to get away, he was placed in the
“hole” for seven days. He states that the attack
occurred about a week after he requested the § 1983
packet and that he was punished even though he was attacked.
relief, Plaintiff asks for monetary damages and injunctive
relief in the form of being transferred to another facility.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A
claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining
whether a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of the factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside,
Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a
reviewing court must liberally construe pro se
pleadings, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365
(1982) (per curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must
include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Claim related to work detail/prison programs
alleges that Defendant Shrewsberry “reprimanded”
him after he requested a § 1983 packet by not allowing
him to participate in any programs offered at BCDC and also
by denying his request for “work detail” even
though he qualified for it. The Court interprets this claim
to be that Defendant Shrewsberry retaliated against Plaintiff
in violation of the First Amendment.
based upon a prisoner's exercise of his or her
constitutional rights violates the Constitution. See
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999)
(en banc). In order to set forth a First Amendment
retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he
was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was
taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary
firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse
action was motivated, in least in part, by the protected
Court will allow this claim to continue against Defendant
Shrewsberry in her individual capacity. See Bradley v.
Conarty, No. 17-2340, 2018 WL 5883929, at *2 (6th Cir.
Sept. 13, 2018) (“[T]he loss of a prison job can in
some circumstances be deemed an adverse action for purposes
of a retaliation claim.”); see also Walton v.
Gray, 695 Fed.Appx. 144, 145-46 (6th Cir. 2017) (per
action is brought against an official of a governmental
entity in his official capacity, the suit should be construed
as brought against the governmental entity. Will v. Mich.
Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Therefore, in the case at bar, Plaintiff's claim against
Defendant Shrewsberry, an employee of BCDC, in her official
capacity, is actually ...