United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Bowling Green Division
N. Stivers, Chief Judge United States District
matter is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff
Floyd Wesley White's pro se complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, the
action will be dismissed.
is a pretrial detainee incarcerated in the Simpson County
Detention Center. As Defendants, he names “Logan Co.
(Commonwealth), ” Mike Chestnut, Seth Whitaker, Lil
Boosie, ATF, and DEA. He sues Defendants Chestnut and Lil
Boosie in their individual capacities and Defendant Whitaker
in his individual and official capacities.
statement of claims, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
All of afore mentioned parties but not limited to the parties
within themselves (several if not all of the Logan Co. Emplye
as in a whole court, hospital, jail/detention staff, law
enforcement city & county, drug task force) The civilian
parties concerned but not limited to those civilian parties
all conspiried together for whatever there reasons may be
found to be. Having multiple audio/video devices placed in my
body in various places without my consent. I do not wish to
catorgize the exact details of the situation as any false
statement may be held to my accountability. However in breif
detail actions from posioning my food while incarcerated,
sliting my wrists while unconsions, leaving me in a facility
while fumigating it. Surgericaly placing devices in my body
in numerous places. Listing me as an Informant to which I am
not nor ever have been.
Threateng me, [illegible] me, non-stop for more than a year
period now. As well as but not limited to the extent of
statig they would plant evidence on me or my family members
including but not limited to plenty eviedence at my parents
house, sisters house, childrens mothers houses and various
othr family members houes that is to vast to detail as I dont
have legal [illegible] present to properly label, identify,
and recont the exact nature of the possiblites of the
statements made [illegible] from placing drugs, weapons,
properties and much more all for the purpose of incarceratig
me and my family if I did not work for them as an undercover
Informant. I feel as if my life and the lives of fall my
family member are in sever danger. I beg of the recipants of
this matter take immidate action please as the last packet I
recieved was misplaced.
relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary and punitive damages,
unspecified injunctive relief, and other relief in the form
of incarceration of “the guilty parties”
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental
entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must screen
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007). Under § 1915A, the Court must dismiss
the complaint, or any portion thereof, if it determines that
it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327.
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). Although the plausibility standard is not
equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,' .
. . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting
Plaintiff alleges a vast conspiracy by numerous county jail
and other staff, various law enforcement agencies, and
civilian parties to harm him by various means, including
poisoning his food, slitting his wrists, leaving him in jail
during fumigation, surgically placing audio/video devices in
his body in numerous places, listing him as an informant,
threatening him, and planting evidence on him and his family.
The complaint does not contain well-pleaded facts against
Defendants and does not suggest more than a sheer possibility
of unlawful conduct. Conclusory allegations of
unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations
fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;
see also Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854
(6th Cir. 2003) (“‘It is well-settled that
conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of
specificity and that vague and conclusory allegations
unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state
such a ...