United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
CHARLES WEEDMAN, JR. Plaintiff,
M. JOHNSON, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. HALE, JUDGE
Charles Weedman, Jr., initiated this pro se civil
rights action against Bullitt County Police Officer M.
Johnson. Because Plaintiff's claims were related to an
ongoing state-court criminal proceeding, the Court entered an
Order staying the action pending the resolution of the
state-court case. Plaintiff has now filed a letter in which
he indicates that “all the charges were dropped on
me” and asks “this Honorable Court to make a
ruling on this case since it is over an done” (Docket
No. 25). He attaches to the filing the Bullitt Circuit
Court's Order of dismissal without prejudice of the
criminal case against him (DN 25-1). The Court construes
Plaintiff's letter as a motion to lift the stay in this
action, and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this
motion (DN 25) is GRANTED.
Court will now screen Plaintiff's complaint and amended
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Johnson violated
his constitutional rights on October 21, 2017, by failing to
ask Plaintiff for permission to search the car he was driving
and by failing to “read my rights to me.”
Plaintiff indicates that he was arrested after the officer
found “a small amount of meth and pot hide in the car
witch was not mine.”
has also filed an amended complaint in which he claims that
gave false information to get me indicted such as me knowing
the car I was driving had expired tags on no insurance . . .
an I did not know the tags were out this was not my care . .
. the officer also said the car was mine it is in Cory
Snell's name I was only borrowing it to take his kids my
grandkids back to there foster parents . . . The officer said
the drugs were found on me. This is not true . . . .
records provided by Plaintiff from his state-court criminal
proceedings indicate that, in December 2017, Plaintiff was
indicted by a Bullitt County grand jury for operating a motor
vehicle with “no/expired” tags; no motor vehicle
insurance; illegal possession of a controlled substance in
the first degree (methamphetamine); illegal possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana); and illegal use or
possession of drug paraphernalia. (DN 7-1, pp. 6-8). However,
as stated above, the criminal charges have been dismissed.
neither the complaint nor the amended complaint does
Plaintiff indicate in what capacity he sues Defendant
Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court
must review this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). On
review, a district court must dismiss a case at any time if
it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
courts are to hold pro se pleadings “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this
duty to be less stringent “does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations, ” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979), or to create a
claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975). To command otherwise would require courts “to
explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro
se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district
court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper ...