United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. HALE, JUDGE.
Zackary Timmerman, pro se, filed this in forma
pauperis civil-rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. This case is before the Court for screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199 (2007). For the following reasons, this case will be
dismissed in part and allowed to continue in part.
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
is currently a prisoner at the Kentucky State Penitentiary
(KSP). He names as Defendants the following Luther Luckett
Correctional Complex (LLCC) employees: Sgt. Kelly Goodlett,
Sgt. Jeremy Smith, Lt. David Crawford, Warden Scott Jordan,
and Sgt. Ryan Jansen. He also names Correct Care Solutions
(CCS), the medical provider at LLCC. All Defendants are sued in
their official and individual capacities.
states that on January 4, 2018, while housed at LLCC he was
tased by Defendants Crawford and Jeremy Smith and had
“OC” deployed in his face by Defendant Goodlett
in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution's Bill of Rights.
He alleges that he passed out from the multiple tasings and
has partial memory loss, chest pains, migraines, and anxiety
but received no treatment from CCS.
next alleges that on May 8, 2018, he was tased three times
while in a restraint chair by Defendant Jansen and again
received no medical treatment. He also alleges that
retaliation against him occurred at LLCC because of
grievances he filed. He identifies the retaliation as having
personal property taken; being placed in segregation; being
on razor restriction; being denied sporks, library,
recreation, linen exchange, cell cleaning, and contact with
family except through U.S. mail; and verbal and mental abuse
such as cell searches. The only Defendant he identifies with
regard to the retaliation claim is Defendant Jordan, who he
says “allowed all of this to happen.”
relief, he asks for monetary damages. He attaches a number of
exhibits to his complaint, including copies of grievances and
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A
claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining
whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside,
Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a reviewing
court must liberally construe pro se pleadings,
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per
curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
under Universal Declaration of Human Rights
claims under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights fail
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty or
international agreement that imposes legal obligations.
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734
(2004) (“[T]he Declaration does not of its own force
impose obligations as a matter of international law.”).
Rather, it is a statement of principles aimed at providing a
common standard for international human rights. Id.
at 734-35. Because it is not enforceable in American courts,
Plaintiff's claims alleging violations of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights will be dismissed.
against Defendant Jordan
alleges that while at LLCC he was retaliated against in
various ways because of grievances he filed and that
Defendant Jordan, the warden, “allowed all of this to
doctrine of respondeat superior, or the right to
control employees, does not apply in § 1983 actions to
impute liability onto supervisors. Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978); Taylor v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 69 F.3d
76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729
F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Rather, to establish
supervisory liability in a § 1983 action, “[t]here
must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly
participated in it. At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff
must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly
authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.”
Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421. “Likewise, simple
awareness of employees' misconduct does not lead to
supervisor liability.” Leary v. Daeschner, 349
F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lillard v. Shelby
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Supervisory liability “must be based on active
unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon ‘a
mere failure to ...