United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
REBECCA GRADY JENNINGS, DISTRICT JUDGE
Kemeron Montez Hardin, pro se, filed this in
forma pauperis action on the Court's approved 42
U.S.C. § 1983 complaint form. This case is before the
Court for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.
1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199 (2007). For the following reasons, this case
will be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF CLAIMS
is incarcerated in the Hardin County Detention Center (HCDC).
He names as Defendants the Kentucky Department of Corrections
(KDOC), the HCDC, KDOC Offender Information Supervisor Duncan
Kendall, and HCDC Class D Coordinator A. Jessie. He states
that he was sentenced in 2013 to ten years in jail for theft;
that he was released on parole; and that he violated his
parole 56 days later and received a “24 month (2 yr)
flop.” He alleges that the time shown on his time card
does not correspond to the “good time” he has
earned. According to his complaint, Plaintiff “should
have served out 12/1/2018 or 1/1/2019, ” putting him
past his serve-out date. He states that he has written
multiple requests to the KDOC to no avail. He also alleges
that he has been “denied to go to the R.C. building due
to a 12 yr old escape from 2007” even though he has not
been classified as an escape risk and that he has been
wrongfully denied the right to earn work credit.
relief, Plaintiff asks for monetary and punitive damages.
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the action, if the
Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2). A
claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Id. at 327. When determining
whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the Court must construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff and accept all factual
allegations as true. Prater v. City of Burnside,
Ky., 289 F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). While a
reviewing court must liberally construe pro se pleadings,
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per
curiam), to avoid dismissal, a complaint must include
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
1983 provides a private cause of action against state
officials acting “under color of state law” that
deprive persons of “a right secured by the Federal
Constitution or laws of the United States.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that
prisoners have a liberty interest in the correct application
of jail credits to their sentences, see Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005), the Supreme Court also has
held that when the application of good- time credits
necessarily results in the prisoner's “immediate
release from physical custody” or “in shortening
the length of their actual confinement in prison, habeas
corpus [is] their appropriate remedy.” Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973). Thus, Plaintiff
fails to state a § 1983 claim related to being held past
his serve-out date due to alleged miscalculations by
Plaintiff's claims for monetary and punitive damages are
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Under the Heck doctrine, a state prisoner may not
file a § 1983 suit for damages or equitable relief
challenging his conviction or sentence if a ruling on his
claim would render the conviction or sentence invalid, until
and unless the conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by Executive Order, declared invalid
by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87;
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81-82 (“[A]
state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent
prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or
equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's
suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison
proceedings) - if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its
regard to Plaintiff's claims that he has been denied the
right to go to a particular building based on fears of his
escape, a prisoner has no constitutional right to be held in
a specific security classification. Garrison v.
Corr, 26 Fed.Appx. 410, 412 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)). Nor does
a Kentucky prisoner have a right to be housed in a particular
place. Ward v. Dyke, 58 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir.
1995); see also Ky. Rev. Stat. §§
196.070(1), 197.065 (granting Department of Corrections
discretion to decide where to place or transfer prisoners).
Therefore, the complaint does not state a claim related to
where Plaintiff can or cannot go within the prison.
regarding Plaintiffs claim that he should be allowed to earn
work credit, a prisoner does not have a constitutional right
to prison employment. Martin v. O'Brien, 207
Fed.Appx. 587, 590 (6th Cir. 2006); Argue v.
Hofmeyer, 80 Fed.Appx. 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding
prisoners have no constitutional right to rehabilitation,
education, or jobs). Because “no prisoner has a
constitutional right to a particular job or to any job,
” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir.
1987) (per curiam), Plaintiffs claim related to not being
able to work fails to state a claim.