United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. HALE, JUDGE
Jason Ryan Poole filed the instant pro se 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action proceeding in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Docket No. 7) one week
after filing his original complaint. The Court construes the
amended complaint as a motion to amend the complaint and
GRANTS the motion. See Fed. R. Civ.
matter is before the Court on initial review of the amended
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons
stated below, the Court will dismiss the action.
is a convicted inmate at the Hardin County Detention Center
(HCDC). He sues HCDC; Major Timbers, the Assistant Jailer at
HCDC; Jailer Danny Allen; and Corporal Gunter, a correctional
officer at HCDC. He sues Defendants in their individual and
states that on September 8, 2018, he was “caught in the
midst of another inmate being pepper sprayed, and I was
sprayed as a result.” He states that the incident began
when officers came into the pod “to lock us all down
over something in which I had no involvement.” He
asserts, “I do not know why inmates were being maced,
but I do know that I was maced as a result of an
continues, “Once I was maced and locked down, I
repeatly requested proper treatment and was completely
ignored. I was unable to clean the pepper spray until the
following day, which is directly against the protocol
pertaining to being sprayed.” He asserts, “Not
only was the situation in which I was sprayed uncalled for,
but the fact that officers refused to allow me to clean
myself up was reckless and totally unprofessional.”
Plaintiff further states, “I presented no physical or
verbal threat and was in fact not even the individual that
the officer intended on spraying.”
relief, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages and to be released
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).