United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Paducah
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
B. RUSSELL, SENIOR JUDGE
a pro se prisoner civil rights action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted
Plaintiff Cindy Mitchell leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. This matter is before the Court for screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims but
allow her the opportunity to amend her complaint.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
is incarcerated as a convicted prisoner at the McCracken
County Jail (MCJ). She brings this action against Officer
Chelsee Breakfield of the Paducah Police Department in her
official capacity only.
complaint, Plaintiff alleges as follows:
On Sunday July 1st, 2018, Officer  Breakfield
answered a call from Laura Hayden and came to my motel room
at Hickory House . . . peeping in my window all because Laura
Hayden was physically trying to get $300.00 out of my federal
government survivors pension under false pretenses. That is a
small claims court case and that is what Officer 
Breakfield should have told Mrs. Hayden. Instead, Officer 
Breakfield arrested me based on Laura Hayden's phone
call. She also illegally searched the motel room without a
search warrant. She basically forced me to incriminate
myself. She turned her back and walked into the bathroom and
came back outside and said this is your meth pipe. But she
never found anything on my person or in any of my belongings
. . . . Offcer  Breakfield also illegally stripped searched
me and exposed my breast to her male partner . . . and tried
to expose my vagina to him as well. Also Chris Myers was in
Room 122 with me. He has a pryor manufacturing meth case from
2006 and Officer  Breakfield arrested me but did not arrest
Chris Myers that was discrimination.
relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and states that
“Officer  Breakfield should lose her job."
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To
command otherwise would require the Court “to explore
exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se
plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from
its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an
advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most
successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
1983 creates no substantive rights, but merely provides
remedies for deprivations of rights established
elsewhere.” Flint ex rel. Flint v. Ky. Dep't of
Corr., 270 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2001). Two elements
are required to state a claim under § 1983. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980). “[A] plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of
state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988). “Absent either element, a section 1983 claim
will not lie.” Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d
502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
sues Defendant Breakfield in her official capacity only.
“[O]fficial-capacity suits . . . ‘generally
represent  another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.'”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)
(quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc.
Servs.,436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Thus,
Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against Defendant
Breakfield are actually against her employer, which is the
City of Paducah. See, e.g., Lambert v.
Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. ...