United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
J. HALE, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
a pro se civil rights action brought by a convicted
prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has
granted Plaintiff Paul David Strong leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court for
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons
set forth below, this action will be dismissed.
SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT
is incarcerated at the Louisville Metro Department of
Corrections. He completed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint
form to initiate this action. On this form, Plaintiff names
Sherry Kemper as the only Defendant and indicates that she is
a “CPA (currently disabled)” at Merrill Lynch.
“Statement of Claims” section of the form,
Plaintiff states as follows:
On April 5th, 2018 I was released on HIP in
Jefferson County, Ky. Ms. Sherry Kemper signed the 72 hr form
stating there was no firearms on the premises at 4110 Sirate
Ln Louisville, Ky 40229.
On April 6th, 2018 I had my personal property
brought to the above address . . . .
On April 19th the HIP officer did a home visit in
which firearms and narcotics were found on premises I was
immediately arrested. Firearms were registered to a Sherry
Kemper. Upon my arrest, my personal property (listed)
remained on premises at above address in the care of Sherry
Kemper. I have body camera footage of property from officers
doing home visit.
Sherry Kemper has failed to come forward with property as
well as telling detectives that property was stolen. So its
my understanding that her home owners' insurance should
cover property (listed): . . .
then lists several items, including vehicles, a riding lawn
mower, a car stereo, laptops, motorcycle helmets, jackets,
and a chainsaw.
relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and a “lien
against property at 4110 Sirate Ln Louisville, Ky
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and