United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
CLIFFORD D. MORRIS Plaintiff
MARK BOLTON, et al. Defendants
Rebecca Grady Jennings, District Judge United States District
Clifford D. Morris filed the instant pro se 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action proceeding in forma
pauperis. The complaint is now before the Court for
initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the
reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the action upon
SUMMARY OF FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
a pretrial detainee at the Louisville Metro Department of
Corrections (LMDC) at the time he filed his complaint,
sues the following Defendants: Mark Bolton, the Director of
LMDC; Jefferson Circuit Court Judges Susan Gibson and Ann
Delhaney; and Dr. Russell Williams, whom he identifies as a
“Psy. D.” He sues all Defendants in both their
individual and official capacities.
states that in “August 2016 and each court date I made
their forward in 2016 in Judge Ann D. court Rm 101, I ask for
counsel be replaced that I fire Kalson Chan off my case
because didn't file compency test, fast and speedy trial
motion in my case.” He reports that “Ann D.
stated he wouldn't be replaced and don't take rocket
docket deal you'll not like out come escape II in court
August 2016.” Plaintiff asserts that this violated his
rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
also states, “12-2-16, 1-26-17, 7-17-17 Judge Susan G.
allowed Kalson Chan to remain on my case's after fired
him in court hearings.” He asserts, “This
violates my C/R 6, 8, 14th Amendment by Kalson C
and Susan G. . . .”
further states the following:
On 2-11-17 Dr. Williams and Dr. Eye do compency test at LMDC
gym room for 3 hours of testing. With me fully compling with
both doctors. They leave saying be back in March with test
results, next time see Dr. Williams is on 5-3-17 at [Kentucky
Correctional Psychiatric Center] day room after I refuse
visit him security violated my 8th Amendment by
allowing Dr. to come inside unit. I refused speak and said
fire Kalson. I refuse visit Dr 7-15-17 LMDC security violates
C/R 8th Amend by letting him in to unit I refuse
talk & said [illegible] them. 9-11-17 compency hearing
Susan G violated my C/R 6, 8, 14th Amendment by
allowing Chan. Dr. Williams manipulate my right to represent
myself and allow them hold hearing after fired them. Dr.
Allen testified I was comptent 9-11-17 and my second trip to
KCPC on hearing date 3-12-18, Kalson, Susan, Dr. Williams
manipulated my C/R 6, 8, 14th Amendment and sent
me back for 3rd compency at KCPC.
asserts, “Security & Mark Bolton allowed Dr on
2-19-18 after refused visit Dr. Williams again. Susan,
Kalson, Dr. Williams my KCPC trip has been cruel treatment,
and Dr. Allen prove comptent 9-11-17 and 3-12-18 and last
trip 7-13-18.” He continues, “Susan, Kalson Dr.
Williams violates my C/R 6, 8, 14th Amendment that
keep me in jail.” Plaintiff further states, “Mark
Bolton has played roll in keeping me incarcerated by security
allowing Dr. Williams into LMDC 7-15-17 and 2-19-18 after
refuse visit him both dates. Mark violates my C/R
8th Amendment that keeps me incarcerated.”
As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages
and “released on O/R bonds all charges Circuit
prisoner initiates a civil action seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the trial court
must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of it, if the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See §
1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). “But the district court need not accept a
‘bare assertion of legal conclusions.'”
Tackett, 561 F.3d at 488 (quoting Columbia
Natural Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th
Cir. 1995)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
this Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to
be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), “[o]ur duty to be ‘less
stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to
conjure up unpled allegations.” McDonald v.
Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted). And this Court is not required to create a claim
for Plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975).