United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Rebecca Grady Jennings, United States District Court District
matter comes before the Court on Defendant, JeJuan L.
Bradshaw's, Motion to Suppress. Defendant filed his
Motion to Suppress on June 5, 2018. [DN 15]. After filing a
motion for continuance, Plaintiff, the United States of
America filed a response to the Motion to Suppress. [DN 21].
On September 11, 2018, a suppression hearing was held.
Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a post-hearing response to the
Motion to Suppress [DN 29], and Defendant filed a
post-hearing memorandum. [DN 30]. On November 30, 2018,
United States Magistrate Judge Colin Lindsay issued a
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation
(“R&R”) on the remaining issues, recommending
that the Motion to Suppress be denied. [DN 32]. Objections
were timely filed by Defendant. [DN 33]. These matters are
now ripe for adjudication.
reasons set forth below, the Court OVERRULES
Defendant's Objections [DN 33], ACCEPTS
Magistrate Judge Lindsay's R&R without modification
[DN 32] and DENIES Defendant's Motion to
Suppress [DN 15].
Bradshaw objects to both the R&R's factual findings
and legal analysis. [DE 33]. Mr. Bradshaw objects to the
R&R's factual findings on grounds that it incorrectly
states that Mr. Bradshaw was the only person in the area when
police arrived at Hibbett Sports and that the officers
witnessed him leaving the scene of the alarm. Mr. Bradshaw
also objects to the R&R's legal analysis and
conclusions, asserting that the stop was unconstitutional
because the officers lacked reliable information regarding
the “type of criminal activity afoot” and
information “to specifically identify Mr. Bradshaw as
the perpetrator.” [DN 33, at 135].
Standard Of Review.
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 59(b)(1), a district court may refer a motion to
suppress to a magistrate judge to conduct an evidentiary
hearing, if necessary, and submit proposed findings of fact
and recommendations for the disposition of the motion. This
Court must “make a de novo determination of
those portions of the report or specific proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). After
reviewing the evidence, the Court is free to accept, reject,
or modify the proposed findings or recommendations of the
magistrate judge. Id. Moreover, the Court need not
review, under a de novo or any other standard, those
aspects of the report and recommendation to which no specific
objection is made. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150
(1985). Rather, the Court may adopt the findings and rulings
of the magistrate judge to which no specific objection is
filed. Id. at 151.
Mr. Bradshaw's Objections To The Findings Of Fact
Contained In The R&R.
Bradshaw objects to Magistrate Judge Lindsay's
characterization of the following facts: (1) “that Mr.
Bradshaw ‘was the only person in the area'”
[DN 33, at 137]; and (2) “that Mr. Bradshaw ‘was
leaving the scene of an alarm.'” [Id.].
The R&R states Bradshaw was the only pedestrian in the
area. [DE 32, at 129, citing Sept. 11, 2018 Tr.
19, 31]. It also states that the officers encountered one
moving vehicle as they approached the store from across a
large parking lot, but that the moving vehicle was at the
other end of the parking lot opposite the store.
[Id. citing DE 23, Def.'s Exh. 11:54]. The
officers then encountered Mr. Bradshaw walking a few feet
from the store. [Id. citing DE 23, Def.'s Exh. 1
2:26]. Having reviewed Officer Gadegaard's testimony, the
Court finds that the R&R correctly reflects the fact that
Mr. Bradshaw was the only pedestrian the officers saw as they
arrived at the scene. [DE 32, Sept. 11, 2018 Tr. 19, 30-31].
Additionally, the record shows that although Mr. Bradshaw did
not enter Hibbett Sports the morning of the stop, police
witnessed him walking away from the general vicinity of the
store through a field located directly behind Hibbett Sports.
[DE 32, Sept. 11, 2018 Tr. 18-19]. Therefore, the
R&R's statement that Mr. Bradshaw “was leaving
the scene of an alarm” is a fair characterization of
the facts. Accordingly, the Court overrules Mr.
Bradshaw's objections to the findings of fact contained
in the R&R. As such, the R&R's factual findings
are incorporated by reference and relied on as true for
purposes of discussing Mr. Bradshaw's objection to
Magistrate Judge Lindsay's legal analysis.
Mr. Bradshaw's Objection To The Legal Analysis Contained
In The R&R.
Bradshaw objects to Magistrate Judge Lindsay's finding
that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr.
Bradshaw outside Hibbett Sports. [DN 33, at 135]. Mr.
Bradshaw argues that the stop was unconstitutional because of
“[t]he lack of reliable information available to the
officers” regarding “whether there was any type
of criminal activity afoot and the
information known to specifically identify Mr. Bradshaw as
the perpetrator.” [Id.]. This objection is
identical to the arguments made by the Defendant in his
Motion to Suppress and his post-hearing Memorandum.
[See DN 15, 30].
“objection . . . that merely reiterates arguments
previously presented, does not adequately identify alleged
errors on the part of the magistrate judge.” Altyg
v. Berryhill, No. 16- 11736, 2017 WL 4296604, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2017). Therefore, Mr. Bradshaw's
general objection and repetition of the arguments previously
made in his Motion to Suppress and Memorandum is insufficient
to qualify as an objection. Accordingly, the Court need not
conduct a de novo review of the Magistrate
Judge's report with regard to Mr. Bradshaw's
objection. Ells v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-00604-TBR,
2018 WL 1513674, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 27, 2018).
even if the Court were to consider the merits of this
objection and conduct a de novo review, the R&R
is well-reasoned on this issue. A brief investigatory stop is
constitutional if it is “supported by reasonable
suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be
afoot.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). Reasonable
suspicion is not determined by a “neat set of legal
rules, ” rather, courts must analyze the
“‘totality of the circumstances' of each case
to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”
Id. “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal
level of objective justification for making a stop⎯that
is, something more than a . . . ‘hunch,' but less
than the level of suspicion required for probable
cause.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Lindsay's finding that
United States v. Moore and United States v.
McMillian are analogous to the instant case. [DN 32, at
132]. In Moore, a combination of factors created a
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in
criminal activity. United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d
1105, 1107 (4th Cir. 1987). Notably, the police officer was
responding to a silent alarm when he witnessed the defendant
close to the building in question. Id. It was late
at night, the defendant was moving away from the building,
and he was the only person in the area. Id.
Additionally, the court rejected the defendant's argument
that the stop was unconstitutional because the police office
was “not certain that any crime had actually
occurred” on the basis that an officer is “not