United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
J. Hale, Judge United States District Court
Maurice Bond alleges discrimination by his employer, CompuCom
Systems, Inc., in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act.
(D.N. 1) Bond filed a complaint with the Kentucky Commission
on Human Rights (KCHR) regarding the alleged discrimination,
but KCHR found no probable cause to believe CompuCom acted
unlawfully under the KCRA. (D.N. 4-2; D.N. 4-7) Bond then
brought this action, again arguing that CompuCom violated the
KCRA. (D.N. 1) CompuCom moved to dismiss on the ground that
Bond's claims are administratively precluded. (D.N. 4) It
further requests that the Court award attorney fees and
costs. (Id.) Bond seeks leave to amend his complaint
in order to satisfy federal pleading standards. (D.N. 14;
D.N. 16) After careful consideration and for the reasons set
forth below, the Court will grant CompuCom's motion to
dismiss and deny CompuCom's request for fees, as well as
Bond's motion to amend.
contends that CompuCom discriminated against him while he was
employed by CompuCom in April 2017. (D.N. 1-2, PageID # 9;
D.N. 4-2, PageID # 41) Bond first reported the discrimination
to CompuCom authorities, but CompuCom took no action.
(Id.) Bond next filed a complaint with KCHR in July
2017, asserting that CompuCom discriminated against him due
to his race. (D.N. 4-2, PageID # 41) CompuCom filed a
response with KCHR, denying the allegations. (D.N. 4-3,
PageID # 42) In September 2017, CompuCom fired Bond
purportedly because he was repeatedly tardy or absent from
work and notified KCHR of Bond's termination. (D.N. 4-4,
PageID # 50) KCHR requested information from CompuCom
regarding Bond's employment, termination, and alleged
discrimination, including files and documents related to
CompuCom's employees and procedures. (D.N. 4-5; D.N. 4-6)
After reviewing that information, Bond's complaint, and
CompuCom's response, KCHR issued a final and appealable
dismissal order in March 2018; KCHR concluded that there was
no probable cause to believe CompuCom engaged in an unlawful
practice under the KCRA. (D.N. 4-7, PageID # 68)
than appeal the KCHR decision, Bond filed a complaint in
Kentucky state court alleging that CompuCom discriminated and
retaliated against him unlawfully under the KCRA. (D.N. 1-2)
CompuCom removed the case to this Court and moved to dismiss,
arguing that Bond's claims are barred by the
election-of-remedies doctrine and administratively precluded.
(D.N. 1; D.N. 4, PageID # 139) CompuCom also requests an
award of attorney fees and costs because Bond filed this
action despite being aware of the KCHR proceedings.
(Id.) Bond, without directly addressing the issue of
administrative preclusion, maintains that the KCHR
proceedings were not thorough enough to be barred under the
election-of-remedies doctrine. (D.N. 14, PageID # 117)
Additionally, while Bond seeks leave to amend his complaint
in order to satisfy federal pleading standards, he has not
submitted a proposed amended complaint. (D.N. 13, PageID #
MOTION TO AMEND
to amend should be “freely” granted “when
justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). This means
that “[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared
reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or . . . futility of
amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules
require, be ‘freely given.'” Pittman v.
Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 640-41 (6th
Cir. 2018) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)). But a proposed amendment is futile, and should not
be permitted, if the amendment could not survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Beydoub v. Sessions, 871
F.3d 459, 469 (2017).
a plaintiff must attach a copy of his proposed amended
complaint to a motion to amend. Kuyat v. BioMimetic
Therapeutics, Inc., 747 F.3d 435, 444 (6th Cir. 2014).
“Although courts may (and in the ordinary course
should) require an amendment's proponent to attach a copy
of the proposed amended complaint for filing in the event the
motion for leave to amend is granted, ‘the motion
itself may be acceptable so long as it puts the opposing
party on notice of the content of the amendment.'”
Shillman v. United States, 221 F.3d 1336, 2000 WL
923761, at *6 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Moore v.
Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1131 (7th Cir. 1993)). However,
“[s]imply requesting leave to amend without providing
details as to what and how the party will amend the complaint
is insufficient[, a]nd a court does not abuse its
discretion in denying a threadbare motion to amend.”
Mowett v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 15-12612, 2016 WL
1259091, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2016).
neither attached a proposed amended complaint to his motion
nor described the changes he intends to make; rather, Bond
merely states that he should be granted leave to amend his
complaint in order to meet the “heightened federal
[pleading] standard.” (D.N. 13, PageID # 105)
Bond's failure to provide a proposed complaint or explain
his intended changes prevents the Court from determining the
validity of the changes, and Bond's motion gives CompuCom
no notice of the content of the proposed complaint. See
Mowett, 2016 WL 1259091, at *7; Shillman, 2000
WL 923761, at *6. The Court will therefore deny Bond's
motion to amend.
MOTION TO DISMISS
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To meet
this standard, a plaintiff must “plead factual content
that allows ...