United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky, Louisville Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
N. STIVERS, CHIEF JUDGE.
matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (DN 11). The motion is ripe for
adjudication. For the reasons outlined below, the motion is
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CLAIMS PLAINTIFF
Thome (“Thome”) does not dispute Defendants'
account of the facts and does not offer any additional
evidence in his response. Plaintiff was a prisoner at the
Kentucky State Reformatory (“KSR”) as a result of
a guilty plea to crimes that are not relevant to this
litigation. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B, DN 11-3
[hereinafter Judgment of Conviction & Sentence]).
was discharged from KSR on April 29, 2016, and the method of
discharge was Sex Offender Conditional Release
(“SOCD”). (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A, DN
11-2). Plaintiff was conditionally discharged in accordance
with the orders of the sentencing court. (Judgment of
Conviction & Sentence). Because of his SOCD status,
Plaintiff was moved to Transitions Halfway House in Newport,
Kentucky, rather than receiving a full release. (Compl. 9-10,
April 28, 2016, one day before discharging Plaintiff,
Department of Corrections officials reviewed Plaintiff's
file and noted that “[p]er crime committed dates there
should not be an SOCD requirement. KSR staff will send a
Judge's letter advising Judge of the discrepancy, but we
will abide by the SOCD requirement per order.”
(Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. C, DN 11-4). Defendants have
provided a copy of an email confirming that Wendy Walrod, the
official who discovered the discrepancy and noted it in
Plaintiff's file, sent an email the same day alerting
other officials and again requesting that a letter be sent to
the judge. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. D, DN 11-5).
unclear from the record what happened for the next month and
a half, but on June 15, Defendants received an email from the
Jefferson Circuit Court containing an amended judgment
without the SOCD designation. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex.
E, DN 11-6; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. F, DN 11-7).
Defendants aver, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the
email and accompanying amended judgment were not initially
emailed to Department of Corrections officials. When
officials received the information, however, an email was
immediately sent directing that Plaintiff be released.
(Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. G, DN 11-8). Plaintiff was
discharged the following day. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex.
H, DN 11-9).
filed this case as a pro se inmate alleging
violations of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Compl., DN 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court
conducted a review of the complaint, dismissing some claims
and Defendants and allowing others to move forward. (Mem. Op.
& Order, DN 5). Two claims remain: (1) a claim that
Defendants Runyell Shirley and Jodi Williams knew or should
have known that Plaintiff was due to be fully released from
custody; and (2) a claim that Defendants Hilary Rucker,
Kimberly Thompson, Ben Mitchell, Josephine Jacovino, Robert
Bearden, Cassandra West, and Nicole Wilder failed to ensure
that Plaintiff was released without additional supervision.
(Mem. Op. & Order 6-8). The Court construed these as
claims brought under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments.
(Mem. Op. & Order 8).
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter
because Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim presents a federal
question. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact
that would preclude entry of judgment for the moving party as
a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving
party bears the initial burden of stating the basis for the
motion and identifying evidence in the record that
demonstrates an absence of a genuine dispute of material
fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the
non-moving party must then produce specific evidence proving
the existence of a genuine dispute of fact for trial. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must do more
than merely show the existence of some “metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986) (citation omitted). Rather, the non-moving party must
present specific facts proving that a genuine factual dispute
exists by “citing to particular parts of the materials
in the record” or by “showing that the materials
cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute
. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
[non-moving party's] position will be insufficient”
to overcome summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at